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THE "ULTIMATE QUESTION": A LIMITED
ARGUMENT FOR TRAFFICKING
IN STOLEN SPEECH
MATrHEW J. COLEMAN*

Introduction
Although it recently came close, the Supreme Court has never answered
the "ultimate question" of First Amendment law: should First Amendment
protection extend to the publication' of truthful information obtained by

a publisher through unlawful means?' In the case of Bartnicki v. Vopper,
the Court took its boldest steps to date in this area and extended the First
Amendment shield to a "'punished publisher of information [that] obtained
the information in question in a manner lawful in itself but from a source

© 2003 Matthew J. Coleman
* Associate, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York, N.Y. B.A., Wake Forest
University, 1997; J.D., Yale Law School, 2000. I would like to thank my wife, Monica, for
providing the encouragement that made this article possible. She read countless drafts and
provided helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to my parents, John and Sharon,
who similarly read every draft and again demonstrated their unwavering support.
1. Throughout this Article, I will use the words "publish" and "publication" to refer to
the dissemination of information via both print and electronic media, including radio,
television, and the Internet.
2. In FloridaStar v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 532 (1989), the majority noted that the Court
has "carefully eschewed reaching this ultimate question, mindful that the future may bring
scenarios which prudence counsels... not resolving anticipatorily."
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who . . . obtained it unlawfully."'3 In this Article, I argue that the Court
should extend Bartnicki' to its logical conclusion that, when certain
conditions are met, the media should be afforded First Amendment
protection for the publication of truthful information, even if the publisher
itself acted unlawfully in obtaining that information.
Understandably, I suspect that many people cringe at the idea that the
Constitution would give special protection to news gathered in an illegal
and possibly immoral manner. Similarly, those people and others must
wonder what kind of incentives such a rule would create. Wouldn't CNN,
The New York Times, Hard Copy, and every other news (and soft-news)
outlet in the country wiretap the phones of public officials, celebrities,
athletes, and potentially even ordinary citizens? Wouldn't other spying
techniques be put in place so that e-mail, cordless and cellular telephone
conversations, and every other imaginable method of communication
would be subject to interception and publication? Wouldn't such a scenario
chill private conversation to an unacceptable degree? After all, why should
ordinary citizens' rights to privacy take a back seat to the free speech
rights of deep-pocket media companies? All of these are legitimate
concerns, but ones I will suggest are worst-case scenarios that are more
than adequately addressed by continuing to hold the press liable for the
unlawful acquisition of information, as opposed to the subsequent
publication of that information.'
Furthermore, I will argue for only a limited extension of First
Amendment protection to the publication of unlawfully acquired information. The Supreme Court has wisely declined "to answer categorically
whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First

3. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (quoting Boehner vf.McDermott, 191
F.3d 463, 484-85 (1999) (Sentelle, J.,dissenting)). See infra Parts 1.B and L.C for a
discussion of the Bartnicki decision.
Bartnicki is not the first case of its kind, but rather the first such case to make its way to
the Supreme Court. Other cases presenting similar facts include Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1999), discussed infra note 86; Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701
(D.C. Cir. 1969), discussed infra note 86; Nicholson v. McClatchy Newspapers, 177 Cal.
App. 3d 509 (1986).
4. More specifically, it is the result reached in Bartnicki,as opposed to the Court's logic,
that I argue should be extended to the "ultimate question." See infra Part 1.C for a critique
of the majority's reasoning.
5. It is well established that the First Amendment does not prohibit the application of
laws of general applicability to the media. See infra note 130. However, existing Supreme
Court doctrine suggests that there may be constitutional limitations on government regulation
of news-gathering activities. See infra note 130.
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Amendment,"6 and I will be true to that advice. Instead of advocating
such a broad categorical rule, I will propose in this Article a more nuanced
approach based on (1) a recognition that there are competing rights on
both sides of the equation - the privacy and speech rights of those whose
conversations are misappropriated, on the one hand, and the First
Amendment rights of the publisher and its audience, on the other hand"
and (2) "[our] profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
Following these guiding principles, which I will refer to as the "competing
rights principle" and the "New York Times principle," respectively, will
sometimes dictate that courts give precedence to the privacy and speech
interests of individual speakers engaged in private conversations over the
publishing interests of the press and vice versa. Developing a
methodology for how to make this decision in any particular case is the
major objective of this Article.
I will argue that the two guiding principles set forth above are fundamentally linked and that both the competing rights principle and the
New York Times principle are best served in any particular case by
weighing (1) the harm to the individual speaker of having otherwise
private communications disclosed against (2) the benefit to the public of
having misappropriated information published - a methodology that I will
call the "harm/benefit paradigm." I will also suggest that although these
factors may seem like wildly variable considerations that could lead to a
lack of predictability in the outcome of cases, the public/private nature of
the speaker and the public/private nature of the speech at issue serve as
useful, though not perfect, proxies for both the harm and benefit sides of
the calculus.9 Because existing First Amendment doctrine already
incorporates the concepts of public/private figures and determinations of
whether information concerns a "matter of public significance," courts will
find themselves well equipped to engage in this type of constitutional
balancing.")
6. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 529.
7. See infra Part ll.A. I for a discussion of why the rights on the individual speaker
side of the equation do not rise to the constitutional level. In Part III, I argue that the mere
imbalance between the nonconstitutional rights of the individual speaker and the
constitutional rights of the media does not necessarily mean that the First Amendment rights

of the press should always trump the rights of private speakers.
8. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
9. See infra Part III for a graphical representation of the relationships among the
public/private nature of the speaker, the public/private nature of the speech, the harm to the
speaker resulting from publication, and the benefit to the public resulting from publication.

10. See infra note 171 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Supreme Court
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As a general matter, an individual speaker is most likely to feel violated,
harmed, and invaded by the publication of unlawfully obtained information
if she is a private citizen speaking about private matters. For instance, the
average person would probably feel less concerned if her discussion of an
upcoming city council election or the state of the global economy was
unlawfully intercepted and subsequently published than she would if her
discussion of intensely private matters, such as family disputes or personal
financial concerns, were illegally intercepted and published for a larger
audience. Similarly, on the benefit to the public side of the equation, the
public will most likely benefit from, and is likely to find most relevant,
discussion of public matters by a public speaker. The utility to the public
of the information at issue is likely to decline as the speaker moves down
the-public/private continuum toward the private citizen endpoint and as the
subject matter of the speech slides down the scale toward more purely
private matters that have diminishing public relevance. Thus, by considering the public/private nature of the speaker and the public/private
nature of the speech, a court will often have performed much of the
analysis required by the harm/benefit paradigm.
A question arises at this point. Is the New York Times principle
necessarily furthered by weighing the benefit to the public of having
misappropriated information published against the harm to the individual
speaker of having otherwise private communications disclosed? It is clear
that this balancing is based ona recognition that the "ultimate question"
presents competing speech interests, but what links the harm/benefit
paradigm to an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate? The
fundamental answer is that by honoring the speech rights of the publisher
in those instances in which the benefit to the public outweighs the harm
to the individual speaker, and by honoring the speech and privacy rights
of the individual speaker in those instances in which publication would
result in greater harm to the speaker than benefit to the public, the
harm/benefit paradigm assures individuals of the requisite privacy needed
to foster "uninhibited" private conversation, while simultaneously
providing the press with the constitutional protections it is due under the
First Amendment. In other words, the course of action that maximizes
benefit and minimizes harm tends to favor the speech rights of publishers
with respect to the publication of public matters discussed by public
figures (which has relatively low privacy costs to the speaker and

jurisprudence that established the public official/public figure/private figure distinctions. See
infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the public/private speech
distinction.
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relatively large benefits for the public) and to favor privacy rights in the
context of the publication of private matters discussed by private speakers
(which has relatively high privacy costs to the speaker and relatively small
benefits for the public). This means that the information most relevant to
an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate, i.e., matters of public significance discussed by public figures, would be widely disseminated, even
if unlawfully obtained by the publisher, and that private citizens could be
comfortable that publishers are unlikely to enjoy First Amendment
protection for the publication of unlawfully obtained private conversations.
Thus, the harm/benefit paradigm avoids the unacceptable chilling of
private discussion, while also enhancing the public debate on matters of
public significance (consistent with both the competing rights principle and
the New York Times principle).
Part I of this Article surveys those aspects of the First Amendment
landscape, including the recent Bartnicki decision, that provide insight into
the Supreme Court's views on the "ultimate question." Part II lays out the
guiding principles, namely the competing rights principle and the New
York Times principle, that I propose should guide constitutional analysis
of the publication of illegally obtained, truthful information. Part III
explores the relationships among the public/private nature of the speaker
at issue, the public/private nature of the speech at issue, the relative harm
to the individual speaker of publishing private conversations, and- the
ensuing benefit to the public from publication. Finally, in Part IV, I
elaborate on the underlying links among the harm/benefit paradigm, the
competing rights principle, and the New York Times principle.
L The First Amendment Landscape
For obvious reasons, news reporters place a premium on information not
intended for public view. Nothing sells papers and attracts viewers and
listeners like a big scoop, and new technology offers unprecedented access
to information that companies and individuals would desperately like to
keep private." In an age when twenty-four-hour news is the norm and the
quantity of available information is greater than ever, the temptation for
reporters to employ unlawful news-gathering techniques to break a big
story is also greater than ever. Additionally, media organizations are

11. See Paul F. Enzinna, Wiretapping and Newsgathering: Criminal and Civil Liability
for the Press, COMM. LAW., Summer 1999, at 7, 7 ("New technologies for information
gathering, storage, and retrieval give reporters access to information that is comprehensive,
immediate, and not filtered for public consumption, and that can result in hard-hitting
reporting.").
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increasingly part of larger corporate conglomerates that ultimately focus
on the bottom line and shareholder satisfaction. 2 And, in the news

industry, nothing is better for profits than having exclusive access to hardto-obtain, newsworthy information, even if gaining access to that
information requires the use of illegal methods. 3
For instance, in 1998, the Cincinnati Enquirer published an eighteenpage spread on the fruit company Chiquita Brands International." Among

other claims, the stories accused Chiquita of bribing a foreign government

12. For example, ABC is owned by Disney, The Walt Disney Co., Annual Report
Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year
Ended September 30, 2002 (Form 10-K), File No. 1-11605, at Exhibit 21; NBC is a
subsidiary of General Electric, General Electric Capital Corp., Annual Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2001 (Form 10-K), File No. 1-6461, at F-47; CBS is owned by Viacom,
Viacom, Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2001 (Form 10-K), File No. 1-9553, at I-1;
and CNN is part of AOL-Time Warner, AOL Time Warner Inc., Annual Report Pursuant to
Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 for the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2001 (Form 10-K), File No. i5062, at 16.
13. 1 do not mean to suggest that the principal characteristic of today's media
environment is an abandonment of traditional journalistic ethics or that reputational
considerations do not play a strong role in discouraging the use of unlawful or immoral
news-gathering techniques. See infra note 126 and accompanying text (citing journalistic
codes of ethics that strictly forbid the unlawful acquisition of information). Instead, my
comments are only meant to show that the news industry today, perhaps more so than at any
other time in its history, is faced with a number of circumstances that provide incentives for
resorting to illegal and invasive news-gathering techniques, including deception, trespass, and
the illegal interception of otherwise private communications.
14. Mike Gallagher & Cameron McWhirter, Chiquita Secrets Revealed, CNN.
ENQUIRER, May 3, 1998. The Chiquita example is one of many recent, high-profile instances
of the media using illegal news-gathering techniques. Others include the highly publicized
case involving two Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. television reporters who obtained employment
at Food Lion grocery stores to videotape secretly unsanitary food handling practices. The
videotape, which included images of Food Lion employees putting Clorox on out-of-date
meat before restocking it, aired on ABC's PrimeTime Live on November 5, 1992. See John
K. Edwards, Should There Be Journalist'sPrivilegeAgainst Newsgathering Liability?,COMM.
LAW., Spring 2000, at 8, 8 (discussing the Food Lion story). Food Lion brought suit against
ABC, alleging fraud, trespass, breach of the duty of loyalty, and unfair trade practices. A
jury found that the ABC defendants had committed fraud, trespass, and breach of loyalty and
that they had violated the North Carolina Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Food
Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 984 F. Supp. 923, 927 (M.D.N.C. 1997). On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court had incorrectly found that the defendants
committed fraud and unfair trade practices but affirmed the lower court's judgment that they
had breached their duty of loyalty and committed trespass. Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital
Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 510 (4th Cir. 1999).
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and circumventing Central American laws that limit land ownership.' 5
Chiquita immediately attacked the Enquirer's stories as inaccurate, and its
lawyers also argued that certain of the paper's news-gathering techniques
constituted crimes. With the help of a confidential source at the company,
"Enquirerreporter Michael Gallagher had accessed Chiquita's voice-mail
system and peppered the stories with snippets from messages left for
employees."' 6 To avoid a lawsuit, the Enquirerrenounced its stories, paid
Chiquita more than $14 million, and ran front-page apologies for three
consecutive days." Gallagher pleaded guilty to two felony charges of
illegal entry into the voice-mail system.' 8
If Chiquita had sued the Enquirer, should the newspaper have been
protected under the First Amendment? Should Gallagher have asserted a
constitutional defense instead of pleading guilty to illegally accessing the
company's voice-mail system? How should a court choose between the
Chiquita employees' privacy rights (and speech rights that would likely be
chilled by a finding for the newspaper) and the First Amendment rights of
the Enquirer and its readers? Existing Supreme Court doctrine, including
the recent Bartnicki case, fails dispositively to answer this question,
although the Court has decided a number of cases involving unlawful
publication that confront the issues raised by competing speech rights and
the tension between free speech and privacy. In the next section, I survey
those cases and set the stage for the Bartnicki decision.
A. Pre-BartnickiCases
As stated above, the Supreme Court has very deliberately declined to
answer the "ultimate question." However, it has decided a line of six
cases, including Bartnicki, that incrementally build up to the inevitable
case involving publication of truthful information unlawfully obtained by
a publisher. These six cases differ from each other and from the "ultimate
question" in the following four principal ways: (1) whether the source of

15. Gallagher & McWhirter, supra note 14.
16. Milan Simonich, Former Cincinnati Enquirer Editor Leaves Gannett for Scranton
PapersAfter Chiquita Series Flare-Up, PITT. PoST-GAZETTE, July 31, 2001, at El.
17. Id.
18. Associated Press, Former Chiquita Lawyer Wants Charges Dismissed; He Says
Reporters Illegally Taped Him, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Jan. 2, 1999, at 10B; Nicholas
Bender, Damage Report, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., May-June 2001, at 41. Bender reports

that Gallagher "avoided jail by cooperating in the prosecution of George Ventura, the former
Chiquita lawyer who had provided the passwords allowing him to hear the voicemail of
Chiquita executives." Id. at 42. Lawrence Beaupre, the Enquirer's former editor-in-chief,
took a job at Gannett, the Enquirer's parent, but was fired after filing a lawsuit against
Gannett that argued he had been made a scapegoat. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

566

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:559

the published information was a private entity/individual or the
government; (2) whether publication chilled private conversation or
whether publication impacted the plaintiffs privacy rights only; (3)
whether or not the information at issue was already publicly available; and
(4) whether the information was unlawfully misappropriated or was
lawfully obtained through traditional news-gathering techniques.'" This
section analyzes the pre-Bartnickicase law, particularly focusing on these
four factors and how they differ from the corresponding considerations
presented by the "ultimate question. '
1. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn
An analysis of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to the
unlawful publication of truthful information begins in 1975 with Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn.' In Cox, a television news reporter
covering the trial of six alleged rapists broadcast the name of the victim,
who did not survive the rape, in contravention of a Georgia statute.
During the course of the trial, the reporter had learned the victim's identity
by examining the indictments - public documents which were made
available for his inspection in the courtroom - and included her name
in a WSB-TV report covering the court proceedings. The victim's father
sued the broadcasting company for damages, claiming that his right to
privacy had been invaded by the unlawful disclosure of his daughter's
name. The media defendants asserted that the broadcast was privileged
under both the First and Fourteenth Amendments."
In contrast to the paradigmatic "ultimate question," which necessarily
involves a tension between the speech and privacy rights of the individual
19. Note that this fourth factor may be subdivided to draw a further distinction between

whether the unlawful acts, if any, were committed by the publisher or by an unaffiliated third
party. This is the defining distinction between Bartnicki and the "ultimate question."
20. See Table I infra Part 1.B for a summary of Bartnicki, its predecessor cases, and the
"ultimate question," in terms of the four factors presented above.
21. 420 U.S. 469 (1975). As the Bartnicki Court pointed out, the historical origins of
the publication of misappropriated information extend back four years earlier than Cox. See
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001). In New York Times Co. v. United States, 403

U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), the Court upheld the rights of The New York Times and The
Washington Post to publish a classified report on the formulation of U.S. policy in Vietnam
even though the report was illegally obtained by Daniel Ellsberg. See DAVID RUDENSTINE,
THE DAY THE PRESSES STOPPED: A HISTORY OF THE PENTAGON PAPERS CASE 42 (1996).

"Although the undisputed fact that the newspaper intended to publish information obtained
from stolen documents was noted in Justice Harlan's dissent, neither the majority nor the
dissenters placed any weight on that fact." Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
22. Cox, 420 U.S. at 469.
23. Id,
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speaker, on the one hand, and the First Amendment rights of the press, on
the other, Cox presented a clash solely between the privacy rights of the
plaintiff and the speech rights of the press and its audience. 4 There was
no potential chilling effect on private conversation likely to result from a
finding for the media defendant, because the press obtained the private
information at issue from the state, not from private communications.
Accordingly, the Court narrowly defined the issue to be decided as
whether the state could prohibit the accurate publication of the name of a
rape victim obtained from public judicial records.'
Justice White, writing for the majority, noted the important role of a free
press in democratic society and the great benefit resulting from the
publication of "events of legitimate public concern," as compared to the
minimal intrusion into the plaintiffs privacy arising from the publication
of information that was already publicly available.26 By placing the
victim's name in the public records, the state had effectively decided that
the public interest was served by disclosure, and the Court was reluctant
to "embark on a course that would make public records generally available
to the media but forbid their publication if offensive to the sensibilities of
the supposed reasonable man."" If there were privacy interests to be
protected, the state, by virtue of having direct control over the information
at issue, should not have disclosed the victim's name in public court
documents. As the Court stated, "Once true information is disclosed in
public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be
sanctioned for publishing it."2

24. The Cox Court stated:
The version of the privacy tort now before us ... is that in which the plaintiff

claims the right to be free from unwanted publicity about his private affairs,
which, although wholly true, would be offensive to a person of ordinary
sensibilities. Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of
information, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrassing or
otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of privacy most directly
confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and press.
Id. at 489.
25. Id. at 491.
26. See id. at 492-95. Justice White stated, "Without the information provided by the
press most of us and many of our representatives would be unable to vote intelligently or to
register opinions on the administration of government generally." Id. at 492. Furthermore,
"'[tihere is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about
the plaintiff which is already public."' Id. at 494 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 625D cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 13, 1967)).
27. Id. at 496.

28. Id.
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Although different from the "ultimate question" in numerous and
important ways, Cox was the first in a line of cases to examine the
competing rights implicated by the unlawful publication of truthful, but
arguably private, information. Nonetheless, the Cox decision falls far short
of answering the "ultimate question." First, Cox involved information
obtained from the government, not a private citizen. Although confidential
information about private persons or organizations revealed by the
government can still significantly impact privacy rights, it is much less
likely to have a chilling effect on private speech. Additionally, the
psychological harm and sense of violation that a plaintiff is likely to feel
is arguably greater if his own communications are stolen directly from him
than if such communications are revealed by a third party. Moreover, the
government freely provided the information to the press; there was no hint
that the defendant media company or its reporter committed bad acts. And
perhaps most importantly, Cox involved the publication of information that
was already public. The majority reasoned that its holding honored the
speech rights of the media and enhanced the amount of information
available to the public with no consequential effect on the plaintiffs
privacy rights. 9 In comparison to the "ultimate question," the Cox fact
pattern was quite media friendly and presented a relatively compelling
opportunity for the Court to affirm its commitment to uphold vigorously
the First Amendment.
2. Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County
The Court's next opportunity to confront the unlawful publication issue
came in 1977 in Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Oklahoma County,"' which,
29. Whether or not the Court was right on the privacy point is debatable. Although the
victim's name appeared in publicly available documents, it is unlikely that her name would
have been widely disseminated absent publication by the press. Rather than measuring the
impact on privacy by focusing on whether previously nonpublicly available information was
being made public, the Court might have more accurately accounted for the plaintiffs privacy
rights by comparing the extent of prepublication and postpublication disclosure.

30. 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per curiam). In the interim between Cox and Oklahoma
Publishing, the Supreme Court decided Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,427 U.S. 539 (1976).
In Nebraska Press, a Nebraska state trial judge, in anticipation of a widely publicized
multiple murder trial, enjoined the media from publishing or broadcasting accounts of
confessions, other than those made directly to the media. Id. at 542. Noting that prior
restraints on speech are especially difficult to justify, the Court weighed the First Amendment
rights of the press against the criminal defendant's right to trial by an impartial jury. Id. at
551-61. The Court ruled that it was not clear that the trial judge's prior restraint would have
protected the accused's rights and that to the extent the order prohibited the reporting of

evidence adduced in open court, it violated the principle that the media may report what
transpires in the courtroom. Id. at 567-68. Because Nebraska Press presented a conflict
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like Cox, arose in the judicial context. In Oklahoma Publishing, Larry
Donnell Brewer, an eleven-year-old boy charged in the fatal shooting of
a railroad switchman, appeared at a detention hearing in Oklahoma County
Juvenile Court on a second-degree murder charge. 3 A pretrial order by
the District Court of Oklahoma County enjoined the press from
"'publishing, broadcasting, or disseminating, in any manner, the name or
picture of a minor child' in connection with a juvenile proceeding involving that child then pending in that court." 2 Reporters present in the
courtroom during Brewer's hearing learned the accused's name, and
photographers snapped his picture as the boy was escorted out of the
courthouse to a waiting vehicle. County newspapers then printed a number
of stories using Brewer's name and picture.3
Relying on Cox and Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart,' the Court held
that "the First and Fourteenth Amendments will not permit a state court
to prohibit the publication of widely disseminated information obtained at
court proceedings which were in fact open to the public .... There is no
evidence that petitioner acquired the information unlawfully or even
without the State's implicit approval.""5
With respect to the four factors identified above, Oklahoma Publishing
is indistinguishable from Cox. The unlawfully published information was
obtained from the state, publication could not be expected to have a
chilling effect on private speech, the information was already publicly
available (which the Cox Court equated with a minimal impact on the
plaintiffs privacy), 6 and neither the press nor any third party engaged in
unlawful news-gathering activities. In terms of a jurisprudential march
toward the "ultimate question," Oklahoma Publishing reaffirmed the
principles set forth in Cox, but broke little new ground.
3. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia"
Whereas both Cox and Oklahoma Publishing involved the publication
of nonconfidential information, Landmark Communications, Inc. v.
Virginia addressed the publication of information that was not already
between the First Amendment and the Sixth Amendment, as opposed to competing speech
and/or privacy rights, I do not consider it part of the line of cases building up to the "ultimate
question."
31. Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 309.
32. Id.
33. Id.

34.
35.
36.
37.

See supra note 30 for a discussion of Nebraska Press.
Oklahoma Publ'g, 430 U.S. at 310-11.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
435 U.S. 829 (1978).
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publicly available, thereby taking a giant step in thi direction of the
"ultimate question." The question presented in Landmark was whether the
state could impose criminal sanctions on persons, including the media, for
disclosing nonpublic information regarding proceedings before the Virginia
Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, a state board that heard
complaints regarding judges' disability and misconduct." The Commission's work was confidential under both the Virginia Constitution and a
state statute.
Nevertheless, in October 1975, the Virginian Pilot published an article
on a pending inquiry and identified the judge who was the subject of the
review. 9 Landmark Communications, the owner of the Pilot, was
indicted for, and convicted of, "'unlawfully divulg[ing] the identification
of a Judge of a Court not of record, which said Judge was the subject of
an investigation hearing' by the Commission. "'
On appeal, Landmark urged the Supreme Court to hold that the First
Amendment categorically protects truthful reporting about public officials
in their public capacities. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
declined this invitation and took special care to avoid announcing a rule
that would go beyond the facts presented and prematurely answer what the
Court would later call the "ultimate question."
The narrow and limited question presented, then, is whether
the First Amendment permits the criminal punishment of third
persons who are strangers to the inquiry, including the news
media, for divulging or publishing truthful information regarding confidential proceedings of the Judicial Inquiry and
Review Commission. We are not here concerned with the
possible applicability of the statute to one who secures the
information by illegal means and thereafter divulges it. We do
not have before us any constitutional challenge to a State's
power to keep the Commission's proceedings confidential or to
punish participants for breach of this mandate."'
The majority conceded that keeping the proceedings of judicial review
commissions confidential serves important interests, including encouraging
the filing of complaints and facilitating the participation of witnesses in
the review process by minimizing their fear of retaliation.'2 Additionally,

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 830.
at 831.
(alteration in original) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-37.13 (Michie 1973)).
at 837 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
at 835.
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the legislature had legitimately concluded that confidentiality protects
judges from unwarranted negative publicity in the case of frivolous
complaints and derivatively helps maintain public confidence in the
judiciary by avoiding the announcement of frivolous complaints."3
However, the Court ultimately found that such interests did not justify
restricting the publication of information that "lies near the core of the
First Amendment.""
Because Cox and Oklahoma Publishing only extended to information
that was already publicly available, Landmark Communicationsbroke new
and significant constitutional ground. Whereas the Court had downplayed
the magnitude of the privacy invasion in those earlier cases, there could
be no doubt that a judge subject to investigation who woke up one
morning to see his name in the headlines had significant privacy and
reputational interests at stake. Nevertheless, given the public nature of the
speech at issue and its direct relevance to the enterprise of democratic selfgovernment, Chief Justice Burger and the majority found that "injury to
official reputation is an insufficient reason for 'repressing speech that
would otherwise be free.' 43 With this holding, the Court linked
constitutional protection of the speech at issue to the public nature of that
speech and thus moved toward a public-concern requirement that would
figure prominently in future decisions, including Bartnicki.
4. Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.
In Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.," the Supreme Court considered
whether a West Virginia statute making it a crime for a newspaper to
publish, without court approval, the name of a charged juvenile offender
was constitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The case
arose when the Charleston Daily Mail and the Charleston Gazette each
learned of a school shooting by routine monitoring of a police scanner."
Both papers sent reporters to the school, and the reporters obtained the
name of the accused shooter simply by interviewing bystanders, the police,
and an assistant prosecutor who was at the school."' The assailant's name

43.
44.
45.
(1964)).
46.
47.
48.

Id.
Id. at 838.
Id. at 841-42 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272-73
443 U.S. 97 (1979).
Id. at 99.
Id.
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was ultimately published in the Daily Mail and the Gazette,'9 and a grand
jury indicted both papers for violating the statute.
Reviewing Cox, Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications,
the Court noted that its "recent decisions demonstrate that state action to
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy
constitutional standards."1' ' The sole interest advanced by the challenged
statute in this case was to protect the offender's privacy,"1 which the
majority found insufficient to justify imposing criminal liability on the
newspapers for publishing a matter of public significance." Moreover,
the statute, which applied only to print media and not to electronic media,
did not accomplish its stated purpose." Although a newspaper could not
lawfully publish the name of a juvenile offender, every television and
radio station in the country could broadcast the same information with impunity."' Accordingly, the Court held for the newspapers and struck down
the West Virginia statute on the grounds that "if a newspaper lawfully
obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then state
officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information,
absent a need to further a state interest of the highest order.""
The Daily Mail case is significant primarily for its articulation of the
"highest order" test. Note that the test predicates First Amendment
protection on (1) the use of lawful news-gathering techniques" and (2)
the publication of (a) truthful information about (b) a matter of public sig-

49. The Daily Mail published the story the day of the attacks; however, knowing of the
statutory prohibition on publication, the paper did not publish the attacker's name. The day
after the attacks, however, the Gazette published the story in its morning edition and included
the name of the attacker. Having already been made public, the Daily Mail published the
name of the attacker in its afternoon edition on the day following the attacks, Id. at 99-100.
50. Id. at 102.
51. Id. at 104.
52. One may legitimately question whether the name of a juvenile offender is a matter
of public significance. The Court did not devote substantial analysis to this question, noting
that it had held in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975), that "[tihe
commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it, and judicial proceedings arising from
the prosecutions ... are without question events of legitimate concern to the public and
consequently fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of

government."
53. Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 105.
54. Id
55. Id. at 103.
56. The "ultimate question" clearly fails this prong of the test. The Daily Mail Court,
however, was careful to note that its "holding in this case is narrow.... At issue is simply
the power of a state to punish the truthful publication of an alleged juvenile delinquent's
name lawfully obtained by a newspaper." Id. at 105-06 (emphasis added).
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nificance. Thus, the test follows Landmark Communications down the
troublesome path toward a public-concern standard." As numerous commentators have pointed out, and as I will explain in greater detail in Part
I.C, a public-concern test raises monumental definitional problems
regarding the categories of speech that will be protected under the First
Amendment and it infringes on the basic tenants of democratic government
by effectively assigning to the judiciary the ability to shape the public
agenda.
5. Florida Star v. B.J.F."
The final case in the pre-Bartnicki line of cases made its way to the
Supreme Court on facts reminiscent of Cox. A Florida Star reportertrainee was dispatched to the Duval County Sheriffs Department
pressroom to review police reports that were routinely made available to
the media.59 One of the reports in the pressroom detailed a recent sexual
assault, including the victim's name." The reporter-trainee copied the
police report verbatim, and a FloridaStar reporter prepared an article on
the crime, which included the victim's full name." However, a Florida
statute made it unlawful to "'print, publish or broadcast . . . in any
instrument of mass communication' the name of the victim of any sexual
offense." 2 The victim filed suit against the Star under the statute, and the
paper moved to dismiss, claiming that the statute violated the First
Amendment.
Because the state disclosed the victim's name to the press, the Supreme
Court again encountered the opportunity to emphasize that the government
had ample opportunity to control the information's release. Moreover,
because the victim's name was included in a police report that was already
publicly available, the Court repeated its familiar conclusion that
"punishing the press for its dissemination of information which is already
publicly available is relatively unlikely to advance the interests in the
service of which the State seeks to act." 3 Following the Daily Mail test
and its holding in Cox, the Court found it clear that the newspaper
lawfully obtained truthful information about a matter of public significance, and that imposing liability on the FloridaStar was unlikely "to

57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
491 U.S. 524 (1989).
Id. at 527.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 526 (alteration in original) (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN.
Id. at 535.
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further a state interest of the highest order."" The state had been in
complete control of the confidential information and had numerous alternative ways of preserving its confidentiality."
"Where . .
the
government has failed to police itself in disseminating information, it is
clear under Cox Broadcasting,Oklahoma Publishing, and Landmark Communications that the imposition of damages against the press for its subsequent publication can hardly be said to be a narrowly tailored means of
safeguarding anonymity. '
In many respects, Florida Star did little to advance the Cox line of
cases. In fact, it has more in common with the earlier cases than it does
with Landmark Communications and Daily Mail. Like Cox and Oklahoma
Publishing, FloridaStar involved publicly available information lawfully
obtained from a government source. Nevertheless, it rounded out a series
of cases in which the Supreme Court vigorously and consistently upheld
the media's First Amendment rights, even as it moved perilously close to
a pure public-concern test. However, the Court had yet to face a case that
presented speech on both sides of the equation or that involved the
unlawful interception of private conversation. Those facts would be
presented in the next, and thus far final, case in the Cox line.
B. Bartnicki v. Vopper
Bartnicki v. Vopper 7 presents the "penultimate question ' 8 - the
publication of truthful information unlawfully obtained by someone other
than the publisher. During 1992 and 1993, the Pennsylvania State
Education Association was involved in contentious collective-bargaining

64. Perhaps more than in previous cases, the Court was extremely careful in Florida
Star to make clear that it was not deciding the "ultimate question."
The Daily Mail principle does not settle the issue whether, in cases where
information has been acquired unlawfully by a newspaper or by a source,

government may ever punish not only the unlawful acquisition, but the ensuing
publication as well. This issue was raised but not definitively resolved in New
York Times Co. v. United States and reserved in Landmark Communications.

We have no occasion to address it here.
Id. at 535 n.8 (citations omitted). Note that the Court's statement also anticipates the facts
presented in Bartnicki, in which a source engaged in unlawful activities and disclosed the illgotten information to an otherwise innocent third-party publisher.
65. For example, "[tlo the extent sensitive information rests in private hands, the
government may under some circumstances forbid its nonconsensual acquisition, thereby
bringing outside of the Daily Mail principle the publication of any information so acquired."
Id. at 534.
66. id. at 538.
67. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
68. Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 406, 407 (2001).
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negotiations with Pennsylvania's Wyoming Valley West School District."
In May 1993, Gloria Bartnicki, the union's chief negotiator, used her
cellular telephone to call Anthony F. Kane, Jr., the union's president, to
discuss the status of the negotiations. During the call, Kane said:
If they're not going to move for three percent, we're gonna
have to go to their, their homes . . .to blow off their front

porches, we'll have to do some work on some of those guys....
Really, uh, really and truthfully, because this is, you know, this
is bad news (undecipherable). The part that bothers me, they
could still have kept to their three percent, but they're again
negotiating in the paper. This newspaper report knew it was three
percent. What they should have said, "we'll meet and discuss
this." You don't discuss the items in public.'
An unknown person surreptitiously recorded the call and delivered the tape
to Jack Yocum, the head of a local taxpayers' organization that had
opposed the union throughout the negotiations." Yocum testified that he
found the tape in his mailbox and recognized the voices of Bartnicki and
Kane." He played the tape for members of the district school board and
ultimately passed it along to two local talk-radio hosts, one of whom was
Frederick W. Vopper. Vopper, who had criticized the union in the past,
repeatedly played the tape on his show, and local television stations began
broadcasting it.73
Relying on federal and Pennsylvania statutes, Bartnicki and Kane sued
Yocum, Vopper, and two radio stations that had aired the tape for actual
damages, statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees and

69. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 112-13 (3d Cir. 1999).
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 113.
See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
Id.
Id.

74. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No.
90-351, tit. I11, 82 Stat. 197, 211-25 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2000)), is the
federal wiretap statute. In 1986, § 2511 (1) of the Act was expanded to include all "wire, oral,
or electronic" communications. See Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub.

L. No. 99-508, § 101(c)(I)(A), 100 Stat. 1848, 1851. In addition to barring the interception
of wire and oral communications, § 251 l(l)(c) also applies to any person who "willfully
discloses, or endeavors to disclose, to any other person the contents of any wire, oral, or
electronic communication, knowing or having reason to know that the information was
obtained through the interception of a wire, oral, or electronic communication in violation
of this subsection." 18 U.S.C. § 251 1(l)(c) (2000); see also 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5703
(2000).
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costs." Both sides filed for summary judgment, and the district court
denied both motions." The defendants asserted two arguments, one
statutory and the other constitutional. First, they argued "that they had not
violated the [wiretapping] statute because (a) they had nothing to do with
interception, and (b) in any event, their actions were not unlawful since
the conversation might have been intercepted inadvertently."" The district
court rejected the first statutory argument on the ground that under the
statute, the intentional disclosure of a communication by a person who has
reason to know that the information was obtained through an illegal
interception is an independent violation of the Act.7" "Accordingly, actual
involvement in the illegal interception is not necessary in order to establish
a violation of that statute."' As for the second statutory argument, the
district court held that there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether
the telephone call had been intentionally intercepted."1 ' "Finally, the
district court rejected respondents' First Amendment defense because the
statutes were content-neutral laws of general applicability that contained
'no indicia of prior restraint or the chilling of free speech.'.'. The trial
court then granted a motion for interlocutory appeal on two issues: (1)
whether holding the media defendants liable under the wiretapping statutes
for the publication of the intercepted information, when they had not
engaged in the illegal interception themselves, violated the First
Amendment; and (2) whether holding Yocum, who also had not been
personally involved in the interception, liable for providing the tape to the
media violated the First Amendment. 2
On appeal, the Third Circuit panel unanimously agreed that the federal
and state wiretapping statutes are content-neutral and therefore subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 3 Using this standard, "the majority concluded that
the statutes were invalid because they deterred significantly more speech
than necessary to protect the privacy interests at stake. " " In dissent,
Senior Judge Pollak agreed with the plaintiffs that the statutory limit on
disclosure was necessary for its deterrent effect and for minimizing the

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Barmicki, 532 U.S. at 520.
Id. at 520-21.
Id. at 520.
Id.
Id.

80. Id. at 520-21.
81. Id. at 521 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 99-1687, at 55a-56a).
82. Id.
83. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1999).

84. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 522.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss4/3

2002]

TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN SPEECH

harm suffered by plaintiffs as a result of publication."
The Supreme Court granted certiorari." Justice Stevens, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, delivered the

85. See Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 133 (Pollack, J., dissenting) (citing Boehner v.
McDermott, 191 F.3d 463, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1999)); see also Peavy v. WFAA-TV, Inc., 221
F.3d 158 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying intermediate scrutiny and upholding liability of media
defendants under the "use and disclosure" provisions of federal and state law).
86. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 530 U.S. 1260 (2000). The Third Circuit's decision created a
circuit split. The D.C. Circuit had held in Boehner v. McDermott that a journalist who
published the contents of an illegally intercepted telephone call could constitutionally be
punished for that publication under the Wiretapping Act. Boehner, 191 F.3d at 478. As in
Bartnicki, the journalist defendant in Boehner had legally obtained a tape of a conversation
from an unrelated third party who had acted illegally. Id. at 465. The Boehnercase involved
the illegal taping of a conference call among several Republican leaders of the U.S. House
of Representatives, including Dick Armey, Newt Gingrich, and John Boehner. Id. Boehner
had dialed into the call, the purpose of which was to discuss the House Ethics Committee's
probe of Gingrich, while driving through northern Florida. Id. Boehner's cellular signal was
intercepted and recorded by a Florida couple who delivered the tape to Kay Thurman, a
Democratic Representative from Florida. Id. The tape eventually made its way to three
newspapers, and the New York Times broke the story. Id. For a full discussion of the
Boehner decision, see Rex S. Heinke & Seth M.M. Stodder, Punishing Truthful, Newsworthy
Disclosures: The UnconstitutionalApplicationof the Federal Wiretap Statute, 19 LoY. L.A.
Er. L. REV. 279, 279-84 (1999).
The facts in Boehner are similar to those the D.C. Circuit faced years earlier in Pearson
v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In Pearson,two former employees of then-Senator
Thomas Dodd entered his office without his consent and copied numerous documents that
were damaging to Dodd. Id. at 703. The former employees delivered the documents to a
newspaper reporter who was aware of how the documents were obtained. Id. When
newspapers published stories based on the documents, Dodd sued the reporter for invasion
of privacy and conversion. The D.C. Circuit held for the defendant on the ground that
[a) person approached by an eavesdropper with an offer to share in the
information gathered through the eavesdropping would perhaps play the nobler
part should he spurn the offer and shut his ears. However, it seems to us that
at this point it would place too great a strain on human weakness to hold one
liable in damages who merely succumbs to temptation and listens.
Id. at 705.
More recently, Edmund A. Matricardi Ill, the executive director of the Virginia Republican
Party, was indicted on four felony counts of eavesdropping on Democratic conference calls
and disseminating the transcript to third parties. See R.H. Melton, Eavesdropping Case
Leaves GOP Without a Voice, WASH. POST, Apr. I1, 2002, at T4; R.H. Melton, Va. GOP
Official Is Indicted, Quits; Director Charged with Eavesdropping, WASH. POST, Apr. 10,
2002, at Al. According to newspaper reports, "[tihe eavesdropping by Matricardi is the latest
bizarre episode involving some of the state's best-known politicians, telephone communication and a recording device - which in this case Matricardi used to tape Democrats
plotting strategy after a major court ruling on redistricting." Va. GOP Official Is Indicted,
supra. It is unclear whether Matricardi delivered the transcripts to any members of the press.
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opinion of the Court. 7 Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence,
joined by Justice O'Connor."' Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a dissent, in
which Justices Scalia and Thomas joined."
After discussing the history of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968 and noting that "[o]ne of the stated purposes
of that title was 'to protect effectively the privacy of wire and oral communications,""'' the Court nevertheless affirmed the Third Circuit's
holding. Although agreeing that both the federal and state wiretapping
statutes at issue are content-neutral laws of general applicability, the
majority placed special emphasis on the fact that "the naked prohibition
against disclosures is fairly characterized as a regulation of pure
speech.""
Citing the frequently quoted Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 2 the
Court set the stage for its decision by noting that "[a]s a general matter,
'state action to punish the publication of truthful information seldom can
'
satisfy constitutional standards." 93
The government identified two
interests served by the statute: (1) the interest in deterring the unlawful
interception of private communications; and (2) the interest in minimizing
the further harm to the plaintiff caused by disclosure.' The Court
dismissed the first interest by noting that although punishing disclosure by
the interceptor would likely have a deterrent effect, "it by no means
follows that punishing disclosures of lawfully obtained information of
public interest by one not involved in the initial illegality is an acceptable
means of serving those ends."9 Unlike punishing the theft itself,
punishing the disclosure of the stolen information runs squarely into the
First Amendment."
With respect to the second interest - protecting the plaintiffs'

87. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 516.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 523 (quoting S. REP. No. 1097, at 66 (1968), reprintedin 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2153).
9 1. Id. at 526.
92. 443 U.S. 97 (1979). Daily Mail falls in a line of cases, including Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn, Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, Landmark Communications, Inc.

v. Virginia, and Florida Star v. B.J.F., that are examined in detail in supra Part I.A.
93. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527 (quoting Daily Mail, 443 U.S. at 102).
94. Id. at 529.
95. Id.
96. See Leading Cases, supra note 68, at 413 ("If Congress wants to deter theft, the
Court suggested, it may do so by imposing harsher penalties for that theft; what it may not
do, however, is deter theft by punishing speech.").
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privacy - the majority found it "considerably stronger."9' However, the
privacy rights at issue in Bartnicki (and any chilling effect on private
speech to which such an invasion of privacy might lead) directly
conflicted with the freedom of the press. While declining to decide
whether privacy and speech rights as they relate to private conversation
are "strong enough to justify the application of [the wiretapping statute]
to disclosures of trade secrets or domestic gossip or other information of
purely private concern," the Court held that "[t]he enforcement of that
provision in this case . . . implicates the core purposes of the First
Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful
information of public concern. "9" Rather than engaging in a meaningful
balancing of interests, the Court based its decision almost entirely on its
finding that the intercepted conversation was a matter of public concern."
In dissent, Chief Justice Rehnquist attacked the majority for relying on
the notion of "'public concern,' an amorphous concept that the Court does
not even attempt to define" in reaching a "decision that diminishes, rather
than enhances, the purposes of the First Amendment, thereby chilling the
speech of the millions of Americans who rely upon electronic technology
to communicate each day....... The dissenters then distinguished the Daily

97. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 532.
98. Id. at 533-34. The Court particularly emphasized the importance of its finding that
Bartnicki and Kane's conversation centered on a matter of "public concern." Drawing an
analogy between the instant case and New York Times v. Sullivan, Justice Stevens expressed
the view that
[it was the overriding importance [in New York Times v. Sullivan] of that
commitment [to a public debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open"]
that supported our holding that neither factual error nor defamatory content, nor
a combination of the two, sufficed to remove the First Amendment shield from
criticism of official conduct.
We think it clear that parallel reasoning requires the conclusion that a
stranger's illegal conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield
from speech about a matter of public concern.
Id. at 535 (citations omitted).
99. The D.C. Circuit explicitly adopted a pubfic-concem test in Pearson v. Dodd, 410
F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See discussion supra note 86. In that case, the court declared that
"[iut has always been considered a defense to a claim of invasion of privacy by publication...
that the published matter complained of is of general public interest." Pearson,410 F.2d at 703.
100. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Note that Chief Justice
Rehnquist's argument here dismisses the First Amendment rights on the publisher side of the
equation. Not only does the publication itself implicate the Free Press clause of the First
Amendment, but it also implicates the constitutional rights of the publisher's audience. As
Justice Souter has noted, "freedom of the press is ultimately founded on the value of
enhancing... discourse for the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently
self-governed. . . .In this context, '[i]t is the right of the [public], not the right of the
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Mail line of cases on three grounds: (1) that the government had lawfully
obtained the information in those cases; (2) that the information at issue
in each of the Daily Mail cases was already publicly available; and (3) that
those cases were not concerned with the chilling effect that might result
from punishing the publication of truthful information. "" As for the
plaintiffs' deterrence argument, Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
majority opinion opened the door for a large loophole that would allow an
unlawful eavesdropper to "launder" his interception through a third
party. ' Invoking the famous article by Louis Brandeis and Samuel
Warren on the right to privacy, "' the dissent concluded by minimizing
the interests of the citizenry in the publication of truthful information on
matters of public concern and lamenting the majority's disregard for
"Congress's effort to balance [the plaintiffs'] claim to privacy against a
marginal claim to speak freely.""'
Although the Bartnickidecision does not answer the "ultimate question,"
it provides insight into how the Court might handle such a case. With
respect to the key factors identified in Part L.A and summarized on a caseby-case basis in Table I below, Bartnicki differs from the "ultimate
question" only in that it was a third party, and not the publisher itself, who
unlawfully acquired the information. In fact, Bartnicki presents a fact
pattern so similar to the "ultimate question," that some commentators have
suggested, notwithstanding the Court's specific indications to the contrary,
that it answers the "ultimate question" itself (at least with respect to
speech that relates to a matter of public concern)."*

[media], which is paramount."' Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 678 (1991)
(Souter, J., dissenting) (alterations in original) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 395

(1981)). Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist erroneously suggests that the chilling of private
speech violates the First Amendment rights of individuals such as Bartnicki and Kane.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). However, the First Amendment only
protects against government restrictions on speech, not restrictions imposed by private
entities, such as media companies. See infra Part II.A. I. Nevertheless, I agree with Chief

Justice Rehnquist's basic point that the majority's decision gives short shrift to the privacy
and speech rights of individual speakers. See infra Part I.C.
101. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 546-47 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
102. See id. at 551 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
103. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
104. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 553-56 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
105. See, e.g., Leading Cases, supra note 68, at 412 ("The Court's logic in Bartnicki

leads to the (perhaps uncomfortable) conclusion that although the media can be punished for
stealing information, they cannot be punished for publishing that information.").
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TABLE I

Government
Source

Already
Publicly
Available

Lawfully
Obtained

X

X

X

Oklahoma Publishing
Co. v. Oklahoma
County

X

X

X

Landmark
Communications, Inc.
v. Virginia

X

X

Smith v. Daily Mail

X

X

Cox Broadcasting
Corp. v. Cohn

Unlawful
Acts by
Publisher

Chilling
Effect

Publishing Co.
Florida Star v. B.J.F.

X

X

X

Bartnicki v. Vopper
Ultimate Question

X
X

X

C. The Implications of Bartnicki
Bartnicki makes clear that a majority of the Court subscribes to the
view, put forth by Alexander Meiklejohn, that speech on matters of public
concern merits maximum First Amendment protection.'" The decision's
logic goes so far as to suggest that the public-concern consideration
trumps the question of whether the media outlet lawfully acquired the
published information."
Following this reasoning to its ultimate
conclusion, it appears that, even though the media may be punished

106. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELFGOVERNMENT (1948); see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern:
The Perils of an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2 nn. I I12 (1990) (listing commentators who think that the First Amendment should only protect
speech relating to self-government). Although my claims in this Article may sometimes yield
results that the Meiklejohn School would favor, i.e., the protection of public discourse even
at the expense of private conversation, I do not argue that speech on matters of public
concern should categorically trump other types of speech. Indeed, I argue that the "ultimate
question" presents a situation in which there are societally important speech rights on both
sides of the case and that differing circumstances impact which side a court should ultimately
favor in any particular situation. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 22-27.
107. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 535 ("We think it clear ... that a stranger's illegal
conduct does not suffice to remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter
of public concern.").
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consistent with the First Amendment for the unlawful interception of
private communications, it may not be punished consistent with the First
Amendment for the subsequent publication of that information so long as
the information relates to a matter of public concern. In this section, I
address the two primary consequences of Bartnicki, which correspond to
the two interests raised by the plaintiffs - privacy and deterrence. First,
I argue that the Supreme Court's effective adoption of the public-concern
test in this context is doctrinally troublesome, in large part because it
dismisses to an unacceptable degree the plaintiffs' privacy claims. Second,
I address the question of what kind of incentives the Bartnicki rule creates
for the news industry. If the Supreme Court were to extend the Bartnicki
holding to the "ultimate question," would electronic eavesdropping become
so pervasive as to seriously chill private conversation, or are there other
considerations that would adequately deter such conduct?
1. The Public-Concern Test
In the cases preceding Bartnicki, the Supreme Court clung to the notion
that it had adopted a balancing approach in deciding whether to extend
constitutional protection to unlawful publication," while at the same
time drifting closer and closer to a categorical test based on whether the
speech at issue related to a matter of public concern. In Bartnicki, which
presented the clearest instance of competing interests of any case in the
Cox line, the Court inexplicably abandoned whatever may have been left
of the old balancing approach. With the Bartnicki Court's abandonment of
this approach, "[t]wo lessons thus emerge from the case: first, the media
can publish information that they themselves steal, and second, the lawfulacquisition doctrine is dead, replaced solely by a 'matter of public concern
test.'"""'
As for the first lesson and its implications regarding resolution of the
"ultimate question," the demise of the lawful-acquisition doctrine is not
particularly troublesome. Presumably, the driving force behind the lawfulacquisition doctrine was the thought that the misappropriation of infor-

108. See Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) ("While [the Court has] shown a special solicitude for freedom of speech and of
the press, [the Court has] eschewed absolutes in favor of a more delicate calculus that
carefully weighs the conflicting interests to determine which demands the greater protection
under the particular circumstances presented."). Before Bartnicki, the DailyMail test required
courts to consider whether the media outlet lawfully acquired the information and whether
the information addressed a matter of public concern as part of the determination of whether
the publication of that information furthered a state interest of the highest order. Id. at 103.
109. Leading Cases, supra note 68, at 412.
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mation necessarily means that the media outlet had trampled on the
privacy (and possibly the speech) rights of the individual speaker in a way
that the Court found categorically unacceptable. However, such an
approach is unwieldy at best, and wrong at worst. It uses the threshold
finding of unlawful acquisition as a definitive proxy for unacceptable harm
to the speaker without considering any of the surrounding circumstances.
As Part III.A explains in detail, not all interception is created equal, and
there are situations in which the benefit to the public resulting from
publishing unlawfully acquired information greatly outweighs the harm to
the speaker."" The most effective and direct method of deciding whether
the benefit to the public outweighs the harm to the speaker is to engage
in a straightforward balancing of interests, taking account of the competing
rights at stake in cases like Bartnicki and the "ultimate question" and
allowing for more nuanced results than those likely to be produced by the
lawful-acquisition doctrine.
The second lesson from Bartnicki - that the Court effectively adopted
a "public-concern test" - is much more troubling than the demise of the
lawful-acquisition doctrine. Ironically, the adoption of a public-concern
test represents the exact opposite approach to that taken in abandoning the
lawful-acquisition doctrine. In abandoning the lawful-acquisition doctrine,
the Court was, perhaps unintentionally, jettisoning a test primarily valuable
as an imprecise proxy for harm to the speaker. However, the publicconcern test is also little more than an imperfect proxy - in this case, for
the benefit to the public. The public-concern test implies that publishing
unlawfully acquired speech on a matter of public relevance necessarily
results in a benefit to the public that outweighs the harm to the individual
speaker. However, such a categorical approach gives insufficient weight
to the rights of private speakers, even if it usually does yield the correct
outcome. Again, a pure balancing approach that is based on more accurate
determinants of harm and benefit is a more desirable way to resolve cases
like Bartnicki and the "ultimate question." At a minimum, such an
approach fully accounts for the interests on both sides of the equation,
whereas the public-concern test focuses exclusively on the benefit to the
public, and the lawful-acquisition doctrine focuses exclusively on the harm
to the speaker.
Moreover, a balancing approach avoids many of the doctrinal problems
associated with the public-concern test. First, even though there is near
110. For example, the interception and publication of Rudolph Guiliani's conversation
about plans for rebuilding lower Manhattan following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center would likely be of consequential public importance, while (depending on the precise
nature of that conversation) potentially causing him very little personal harm.
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unanimous agreement that speech on matters of public concern lies near
the heart of the First Amendment,"' there remains the difficult
definitional question of identifying what constitutes "speech on matters of
public concern," "speech concerning public affairs," or "speech on public
issues." As Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out in his dissent in Bartnicki,
speech concerning public affairs is an "amorphous concept""' that does
not lend itself to precise contours."' "Judges and other decisionmakers
will inevitably exclude from [any such] category, and thus from
constitutional protection, speech that others would consider to be relevant
to public debate."""
Beyond the definitional considerations, the public-concern test has other
potential pitfalls. Although it is clear that speech on matters of public
concern is of central importance to First Amendment jurisprudence,"'
and "speech concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the
essence of self-government," as a general matter, the Court has wisely
declined to hold that constitutional protection extends exclusively to public
speech."' In other words, the importance of public speech has
traditionally served only to elevate its constitutional stature and not to
bring it within the constitutional fold in the first place or to exclude from

11. See Estlund, supra note 106, at I ("The central importance of speech on public
issues, or 'matters of public concern,' is long-established First Amendment dogma.").
112. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 542 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
113. Speech on matters of public concern, as a category of speech, is no different in this
respect than most other categories of speech, including obscenity. Cf Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). There is always the danger of over- and
under-inclusive definitions, the application of which could have perverse effects.
114. Estlund, supra note 106, at 3; accordRobert C. Post, The ConstitutionalConcept
of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation,and Hustler Magazine
v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 670-79 (1990).
115. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966) ("Whatever differences may exist
about interpretations of the First Amendment, there is practically universal agreement that
a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental
affairs."). In First National Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978), the Supreme Court
declared that speech on matters of public concern is squarely "at the heart of the First
Amendment's protection." See also Estlund, supra note 106, at 2 n. 12 ("Despite the variety
of interpretations of the Free Speech Clause, modern commentators agree that speech on
public issues is at least an important concern of the First Amendment.").
116. Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964).
117. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implications of a Right to Stop Peoplefrom Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049,
1095 (2000) ("Political speech, scientific speech, art, entertainment, consumer product
reviews, and speech on matters of private concern are thus all doctrinally entitled to the same
level of high constitutional protection, restrictable only through laws that pass strict
scrutiny.").
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First Amendment protection entirely speech that does not constitute public
speech.
Nevertheless, the Court has deviated from this approach in two
situations in favor of a public-concern test. In Connick v. Myers,"' the
Court held that the speech of public employees is entitled to First
Amendment protection only if it relates to "matters of public concern,""'
and in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,2 ' the Court
held that libelous speech not on a matter of public concern is wholly
outside the First Amendment.'
As numerous commentators have
pointed out, Connick and Dun & Bradstreet, though they draw on the
Court's earlier statements regarding the importance of public speech, take
the dangerous approach of excluding private speech from the shield of the
First Amendment and limiting the realm of protected speech to a category
that is impossible to define precisely.'
Until Connick there was no area of First Amendment doctrine
in which judges were required to make a threshold determination of whether speech was or was not on a matter of
public concern. A long tradition of special solicitude for speech
on public issues played a crucial role in the growth of First
Amendment doctrine, but it did not take the form of an explicit
threshold test or category. The content-based categories of
speech that did exist before Connick defined not the core of
protected speech, but rather classes of excluded or disfavored

118. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
119. Id. at 154.
120. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
121. Id. at 758-60.
122. The Supreme Court has done little to define matters of public concern. In Connick,
the majority stated that "[w]hether... speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by [the expression's] content, form, and context ... as revealed by the whole
record." Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48.
In Dun & Bradstreet, Justice Powell characterized the credit report at issue in that case
as "solely in the individual interest of the speaker and its specific business audience," and
noted that the report "was made available to only five subscribers, who, under the terms of
the subscription agreement, could not disseminate it further." Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S.
at 762. Justice Powell went on to state, "There is simply no credible argument that this type
of credit reporting requires special protection to ensure that 'debate on public issues [will]
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."' l (alteration in original) (quoting New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)).
Professor Post has argued that there is no "principled method of determining what kinds
of issues ought to be excluded from the domain of public discourse." Post, supra note 114,
at 673.
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speech at some remove from speech on public issues. I submit
that this feature of First Amendment doctrine protected speech
on matters of public concern, largely by insulating it from the
vagaries of judicial line-drawing. 3
The public-concern test arguably puts in constitutional jeopardy First
Amendment protection of art, entertainment, scientific speech, and any
other category of speech not directly related to self-government. It also,
quite undemocratically, leaves the judiciary with the task of deciding what
Given the fundamental
is and is not relevant to public discourse.'
5 I am led to conclude that
test,'
with
the
public-concern
problems
although the Bartnicki Court may have reached the right decision, it approached the penultimate question in the wrong way and established a
dangerous precedent for all of First Amendment law.
2. Deterrence
In addition to the adoption of the public-concern test, one might also
question the Bartnicki decision based on the incentives it creates for the
news industry. Beyond the dissent's argument that law-breaking wiretappers could "launder" stolen speech by anonymously delivering it to a third
party, Bartnicki raises the larger question of the effect of the Court's
decision on deterring the media themselves. At first blush, it might seem
that if the media could publish unlawfully acquired information with
impunity, there would be rampant and uncontrolled wiretapping, spying,
and other invasions of privacy. However, I believe that although based on
flawed reasoning, the Bartnicki Court did not necessarily reach an undesirable outcome from a deterrence perspective. On closer inspection,
there are two considerations that adequately address this concern and

123. Estlund, supra note 106, at 3.
124. Id. at 30-31 ("[T]he very concept of a circumscribed category of speech on matters
of public concern applied on a case-by-case basis by the judiciary is at odds with the basic
tenets of democratic self-governance. . . . 'he normative conception of public concern,
insofar as it is used to exclude speech from public discourse, is thus incompatible with the
very democratic self-governance it seeks to facilitate.'... Such a test inevitably charges the
judiciary with the task of developing an approved list of legitimate topics for public debate,
a prospect that offends basic principles of democracy and freedom of expression.") (quoting
Post, supra note 114, at 670).
125. See Volokh, supra note 117, at 1097 ("In practice neither [Connick nor Dun &
Bradstreet] has been a success story for the public concern test. As many critics have pointed
out, the government employee private concern doctrine has proven both vague to the point
of indeterminacy and extremely broad.... Under Dun & Bradstreet, the concept of 'speech
").
of purely private concern' has ended up similarly vague ....
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provide sufficient safeguards for the extension of First Amendment
protection to the publication of unlawfully acquired information.
First, there are reputational and ethical constraints at both the individual
reporter level and at the institutional corporate level. 6 On the reporter
level, a news professional who engages in unlawful acts, even in pursuit
of an otherwise career-making story, risks losing his job, facing criminal
charges, and being forced out of the industry if he is caught. For instance,
the CincinnatiEnquirerfired lead reporter Michael Gallagher in the wake
of the Chiquita debacle.'27 Gallagher also pleaded guilty to two felony
counts of illegal entry into the Chiquita voice-mail system,"" forever
tarnishing his reputation and potentially making it difficult for him to reenter the workforce, whether at another newspaper or elsewhere. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to think that a significant portion of (and
perhaps the vast majority of) reporters would not engage in illegal acts of
interception either because of personal ethical considerations, the
potentially enormous repercussions with respect to their professional lives,
or some combination of the two.
Additionally, similar reputational considerations also exist for the media
company itself. In the Chiquita example, the Enquirer and its parent
company found themselves subjected to intense public criticism upon
revelation of Gallagher's misdeeds and unethical news-gathering methods.
Ultimately, the paper was forced to pay tens of millions of dollars to
Chiquita and to run numerous front-page apologies."r Given that
shareholders (and potentially readers and advertisers) are likely to have
little tolerance for such consequences, one would expect media companies
to provide strong disincentives for their employees to engage in such
activities. As with individual reporters, these practical considerations are
in addition to any purely ethical motivations that might prompt
management to discourage illegal reporting techniques.
Second, if reputational and ethical constraints alone are not sufficient to
deter illegal wiretapping and spying, the legislature can always increase
126. Customary journalistic codes of ethics strictly prohibit the unlawful acquisition of
information. See FREDERICK SHOOK, TELEVISION FIELD PRODUCTION AND REPORTING 327
(2000) ("[These guidelines] form the basis for many individual codes of ethics in
journalism .... Never break a law to expose a wrong .... Leave the making of secret
recordings to authorized officials."); RADIO-TELEVISION NEWS DIRECTORS ASS'N, CODE OF
ETHICS & PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Sept. 14, 2000) (stating that journalists should
"[r]ecognize that professional electronic journalists are duty-bound to conduct themselves
ethically"), available at http://www.rtnda.org/ethics/coe.shtml.
127. See Simonich, supra note 16.
128. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
129. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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the penalties for misappropriation of information. Although the First
Amendment protects publication, it is less clear that the unlawful acquisition of information to be published is a constitutionally protected
activity.' 3" Accordingly, the legislature has potentially enormous
influence on the deterrence point, even if the Supreme Court were to
protect categorically the publication of truthful information, regardless of
how that information was obtained.
By identifying the various deterrence mechanisms that are already in
place, I do not mean to suggest that there will never be future cases

130. It is well established that the First Amendment does not prohibit the application
of laws of general applicability to the media. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663
(1991). As one commentator has noted, "Surely the First Amendment does not immunize the
press from obeying fire safety laws in its buildings or from having its delivery trucks obey
the speed limits." Alan E. Garfield, The Mischief of Cowen v. Cowles Media Co., 35 GA.
L. REV. 1087, 1094 (2001).
However, one must acknowledge that
[njewsgathering efforts are obviously directly related to the ability of media
entities to publish the results of their investigations. As such, the protection
afforded the media to engage in newsgathering activities can be as important
as the right to publish the news. Yet, the U.S. Supreme Court has been slow
to fully acknowledge the constitutional significance of newsgathering activities.
Edwards, supra note 14, at 8.
The Court has touched on this topic in a number of cases, but for the moment, Cohen and
the principle that "laws of general application concerning prepublication activities are not
subject to the same First Amendment protections afforded publication of stories" hold the
day. Id. at 9; accord Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669-70. But see Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665
(1972) (acknowledging that the media has a constitutional right to gather news); Houchins
v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 11 (1978) (confirming Branzburg and noting the "undoubted right to
gather news 'from any source by means within the law') (emphasis added) (quoting
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82). The question remains open whether the media has a
constitutional right to gather news from any source by means outside the law. That question
is beyond the scope of this article, which is concerned with post-acquisition activities. For
a proposed solution to the acquisition question, see Edwards, supra note 14, at 13 (suggesting
that there should be a constitutional news-gathering privilege "if the conduct made the basis
of the action (1) constituted an activity routinely associated with traditional . . .
newsgathering efforts, (2) was engaged in for the sole purpose of furthering publication of
news . . . , and (3) related to a matter of legitimate public concern and interest").
With respect to constitutional protection of news gathering and its interplay with the
government's desire to withhold information, see C. Edwin Baker, Press Rights and
Government Power To Structure the Press, 34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980) (noting a
distinction between "offensive" and "defensive" press claims and suggesting that defensive
claims against government intrusion deserve greater weight than "offensive" claims to
governmental information); Timothy B. Dyk, Newsgathering, Press Access, and the First
Amendment, 44 STAN. L. REV. 927 (1992) (arguing for heightened press access to
governmental information as an additional check on governmental power).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss4/3

2002]

TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN SPEECH

589

involving the illegal interception of private information. Indeed, these
deterrents already exist, and still we see instances of unlawful news
gathering.13 ' Furthermore, the existence of deterrents strong enough to
eliminate completely cases such as Bartnicki and the "ultimate question"
would raise concerns about their effects on a free press and the desirability

131. See, e.g., Charles McCorkle Hauser, Judgment on Journalists: Do They Defiantly
Put Themselves "Above the Law"?, FINELINE: THE NEWSLETrER ON JOURNALISM ETHICS,
Nov. 1989, at 7 (describing how "[a]s a matter of principle, [he] disobeyed the order of a
federal District Court judge"). In 1962, the FBI illegally planted listening devices in the
office of Raymond L.S. Patriarca, a New England mafia boss, without a warrant. Id. In
1985, after Patriarca's death, Hauser, a reporter for the Providence Journal-Bulletin, obtained
summaries of the conversations under the Freedom of Information Act. Id. Patriarca's son
sought an injunction to prevent the Journal-Bulletin from publishing the summaries on
privacy grounds and because the summaries were illegally obtained. Id. The United States
District Court for the District of Rhode Island entered a temporary restraining order barring
publication and scheduled a hearing for two days later. United States v. Providence Journal
Co., 485 U.S. 693, 695-96 (1988). Nevertheless, Hauser published his story in contravention
of the trial court's order. Hauser, supra, at 7. Hauser stated,
We knew we were right, constitutionally, and the judge's order would be
lifted or overturned....
Timeliness was a crucial issue - not because of the 20-year-old material in
the story, but because allowing a court to interfere with time of publication
would be abdicating our responsibility. If we did not stand on principle, our
failure could come back to haunt us in the future, in a case where timeliness
was essential.
Id. The district court fined the Journal $100,000 and placed Hauser on probation for eighteen
months with an order that he perform 200 hours of community service. Providence Journal,
485 U.S. at 697. Hauser and the Journal were ultimately vindicated when the First Circuit
found the temporary restraining order "transparently invalid" under the First Amendment, In
re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1353 (Ist Cir. 1986), and the Supreme Court
declined to hear the case on procedural grounds, see Providence Journal, 485 U.S. at 695.
Also of interest is the story of reporter Robert Kapler. See Robert Kapler, Lying for the
Story... Or Things They Don't Teach in Journalism School, FINELINE: THE NEWSLETrER
ON JOURNALISM ETHICS, May 1989, at 5. Kapler, then a reporter for The Guide, a weekly
newspaper in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, tells of using an assumed name to obtain a job at the
Three Mile Island nuclear power plant. Id. Recognizing that "[Ihying about [his] identity
would not only be illegal, [but] [] would [also] run contrary to the code of [his] trade,"
Kapler ultimately decided that "the issue of nuclear plant safety was crucial enough to make
an exception." Id.
Similarly, reporter Bill Dedman tells of scaling a fence at the Atlanta Federal Penitentiary
(and thus trespassing on federal property) to obtain important information about a prison riot.
See Bill Dedman, Over the Fence: A Case of Crossing the Line for a Story, FINELINE: THE
NEWSLETTER ON JOURNALISM ETHICS, June 1991, at 4. Dedman states, "It seemed more
ethical, more in line with our duties, to go over the fence, if we did it carefully and with
respect for what we found, than to sit across the street eating Salvation Army sandwiches,
waiting for the morning briefing." Id.
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of allowing the media to publish only information that is deliberately and
lawfully made available to them. The deterrent factors I have identified,
at least as they currently exist, are not so harsh as to eliminate completely
aggressive (including occasionally unlawful) news gathering, but they are
strong enough to allay any fears of rampant, unchecked spying by the
press in the post-Bartnickiworld. Even if one rejects the Bartnicki Court's
reasoning, one can still support the result, and even its extension to the
"ultimate question," without undue concern about perverse effects on news
gathering and journalists' behavior generally.
!I. Guiding Principles
Although the outcome of the Bartnicki case is not necessarily objectionable, the Court's reasoning is inherently flawed. The majority failed
adequately to take into account the rights on both sides of the equation
and gave undue weight to the public nature of the speech at issue. In this
Part, I propose that the "ultimate question" would be better resolved by a
more nuanced approach based on (1) a recognition that there are competing rights on both sides of the calculus and (2) "our profound national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."'
A. The Competing Rights Principle
As discussed above, Bartnicki and the "ultimate question" stand alone
in the Cox line of cases because they pit the privacy and speech rights of
individual speakers against the First Amendment rights of the media and
its audience. In adopting the public-concern test, the Bartnicki Court gave
unacceptably short shrift to these competing rights and adopted an
unwieldy categorical approach in a situation that begs for a more delicate
balancing of interests.
The problems presented by the conflict between free speech and privacy
are as old as the United States itself and are problems with which the
Founding Fathers were intimately acquainted - both from the personal
perspective of being pilloried in the press at the expense of their own
privacy and from the perspective of political theorists charged with the
monumental task of designing a new government. As Thomas Jefferson,
writing about the press attacks on John Jay, noted:
In truth it is afflicting that a man who has past his life in
serving the public . . . should yet be liable to have his peace of

132. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
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mind so disturbed by any individual who shall think it proper
to arraign him in a newspaper. It is however an evil for which
there is no remedy. Our liberty depends on the freedom of the
press, and that cannot be limited without being lost.'33
Indeed, the very idea of a free press necessarily implies that the media
must have the right to publish information that others would like to keep
private." Accordingly, resolution of the "ultimate question" must hinge
in large part on reconciling these competing rights. "But there is precious
little record of what freedom of speech and press really meant to the
Framers,""' and the Founding Fathers provided no guidance on whether
and to what extent free speech rights should trump other competing fights.
Thus, in deciding which side of the calculus should be given primacy in
any particular situation, it is important, as a threshold matter, to identify
and categorize precisely the interests at issue. I dedicate the next two
sections to this task. In Part III, I propose a methodology for weighing the
harm to the individual speaker against the rights of the media and its
audience and for concluding which interest should prevail in various
circumstances.
1. The Individual Speaker
On the individual speaker side of the equation are the privacy and
speech fights of the participants in the intercepted conversation. By its
terms, the unlawful interception of a private conversation necessarily
infringes on an individual's right to privacy," and it can hardly be
133. 9 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 239 (J.Boyd ed., 1954).
134. Cf David Shaw, Two Impulses Drive the Media: Prurienceand Self-Preservation;
Clinton Story: Afraid of missing the next Watergate, they pretend to look for a crime when
sex is all it's about, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at B7 ("Reporters can't do their jobs properly
if they are forbidden to ferret out leaks. Watergate, the Pentagon Papers, My Lai and many
other stories of consequence might never have been disclosed - and the public would have
been left dangerously ignorant of important information - if journalists were forced to rely
solely on official, fully identified sources of information.").
135. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH i-10 (1994);
accordLEONARD LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION 214-15 (1960) ("Freedom of the press was
everywhere a grand topic for declamation, but the insistent demand for its protection on
parchment was not accompanied by a reasoned analysis of what it meant, how far it
extended, and under what circumstances it might be limited.").
136. The harm caused by the press's invasion of privacy rights has been a hot button
issue for more than 100 years. Brandeis and Warren, in their famous article on the subject,
addressed both the harm to the speaker resulting from the publication of private conversations
and the concomitant harm to society. The authors state:
Of the desirability - indeed of the necessity - of some such protection [of the
right of privacy], there can, it is believed, be no doubt. The press is overstep-

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:559

doubted that the rampant publication of otherwise private communications
would chill private conversation. The magnitude of the chilling effect is
debatable. If the state could constitutionally punish the unlawful acquisition of private communications so severely that no media entity
would ever attempt to intercept such communications, a finding that the
publication of such intercepted conversations is protected under the First
Amendment would be of negligible significance. Private speakers would
rightly conclude that the threat of disclosure is small because the cost of
acquisition is prohibitively high, and they would engage in conversation
to the same extent as they would even if the First Amendment did not
protect such publication. However, if the Constitution does limit the
severity of punishment that the state may impose for unlawful acquisition,' adding constitutional protection to the publication of that
information would likely contribute to a chilling effect by impacting either
(or both) the quantity or quality of private communication" (or by
ping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency. Gossip
is no longer the resource of the idle and of the vicious, but has become a trade,
The intensity and
which is pursued with industry as well as effrontery ....
complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civilization have rendered
necessary some retreat from the world, and man, under the refining influence
of culture, has become more sensitive to publicity, so that solitude and privacy
have become more essential to the individual; but modem enterprise and
invention have, through invasions upon his privacy, subjected him to mental
pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily injury. Nor
is the harm wrought by such invasions confined to the suffering of those who
may be made the subjects of journalistic or other enterprise. In this, as in other
branches of commerce, the supply creates the demand. Each crop of unseemly
gossip, thus harvested, becomes the seed of more, and, in direct proportion to
its circulation, results in a lowering of social standards and of morality. Even
gossip apparently harmless, when widely and presently circulated, is potent for
evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting the relative
importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspirations of a people.
When personal gossip attains the dignity of print, and crowds the space
available for matters of real interest to the community, what wonder that the
ignorant and thoughtless mistake its relative importance. Easy of comprehension, appealing to that weak side of human nature which is never cast down by
the misfortunes and frailties of our neighbors, no one can be surprised that it
usurps the place of interest in brains capable of other things. Triviality destroys
at once robustness of thought and delicacy of feeling. No enthusiasm can
flourish, no generous impulse can survive under its blighting influence.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 103, at 196.
137. See supra note 130.
138. Jeffery Rosen has addressed the chilling effect from another viewpoint, suggesting
that in an established democracy where there are constitutional prohibitions on the invasion
of privacy by the state, additional restrictions on such invasions by the media may have little
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leading to the development of more secure communications tools, which
would likely only perpetuate the cycle by encouraging the development of
new interception technology).'3 Additionally, other commentators have
pointed out that the erosion of privacy rights negatively affects "ideas of
bodily and social autonomy, of self-determination, and of the ability to
create zones of intimacy and inclusion that define and shape our relationships with each other."'

Even so, and even though the Constitution protects both privacy and
speech, the rights involved on the private speaker side of the equation are
not constitutionally protected rights. "The Constitution presumptively
prohibits government restrictions on speech and perhaps some government
revelation of personal information, but it says nothing about interference
with speech or revelation of personal information by nongovernmental
speakers.''. As Professor Volokh has written, "lots of speech has the
effect, and often the purpose of discouraging people from exercising their
speech rights in certain ways,""'4 but the mere chilling of private speech
does not necessarily violate the constitutional rights of those discouraged

or no effect on people's expectation of privacy. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Purposes of Privacy:
A Response, 89 GEO. L.J. 2117, 2135 (2001). After discussing an instance in which the

"police destroyed an important figure in the Prague Spring by recording his private
conversations and broadcasting them in a radio serial," Rosen concluded that "in America,
where the Fourth Amendment and a web of statutes restrict wiretapping and other undercover
information gathering by the state, I am not convinced that additional restrictions on the
media would add measurably to the social expectations of privacy that are necessary for free
speech to thrive." Id. Even so, it strains credulity to think that extending constitutional

protection to the publication of unlawfully obtained private information would have no
chilling effect on private speech. Rosen's argument suggests that the chilling effect only
occurs because of fear of prosecution based on the content of private conversations. See id.

However, there will also be a chilling effect if private speakers are concerned about the loss
of privacy that necessarily results from disclosure.
139. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?,52 STAN. L. REv. 1461, 1463,
1465 (2000) (noting the "rapid growth of privacy-destroying techniques" and the "private
sector['s]

. . . unprecedented

abilities to collect personal data").

140. Id. at 1466.
141. Volokh, supra note 117, at 1107.
142. Id. at 1108. Volokh states further:
Political bullies try to silence their opponents not only by revealing embarrassing private information about them, but also by calling them nasty (but
nonlibelous) names, citing their interracial marriages as evidence that they are
traitors to their race, attacking them with bitter and unfair parodies, or saying
things aimed at undermining their business affairs ....

Who among us hasn't

at times decided to stay quiet in order to avoid having to deal with our
opponents' vituperation?
Id. (footnotes omitted).
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from speaking." 3 Thus, the paradigmatic example of the "ultimate
question," which involves an invasion of privacy and the chilling of
private speech as a direct result of action by privately owned media
companies, implicates the nonconstitutional privacy and speech rights of
potential plaintiffs.
2. The Media
In comparison to the individual speaker side of the calculus, the media
side involves speech rights that do rise to the constitutional level.
Obviously, statutory prohibitions on disclosure squarely impact the speech
rights of media outlets themselves.'" However, for purposes of
developing a framework to address the "ultimate question," these rights

standing alone are not the most relevant to the analysis. In fact, I am
relatively indifferent to disclosure restrictions on an individual media
company's right to publish private information solely because of those
restrictions' limitations on a particular company's right to speak. I leave
that argument for more libertarian-minded commentators. Instead, the
more important First Amendment rights at issue are those of the media's
audience." '
The press is afforded special treatment under our
constitutional system because of the unique role it plays in disseminating
news, ideas, opinions, and other information to the citizenry.'" Without
the information provided by the media, very few people, including elected

officials, could vote intelligently or form opinions on matters of public
importance" 7 -

fundamental premises on which the Framers established

143. The publication of private information is likely to chill private speech regardless
of whether the publisher lawfully or unlawfully obtained that information. Thus, although
resolving the "ultimate question" in favor of the press would likely chill private speech, this
phenomenon is not limited exclusively to situations involving unlawful acquisition. Clearly,
the First Amendment would prohibit a law banning publication of all private information,
regardless of its source, solely because such publication would impact the privacy and speech
rights of private figures.
144. For instance, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968
bars not only illegally intercepting information, but also disclosing information that the
recipient knows or should have known was acquired illegally. See supra note 74.
145. See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right
of the viewers and listeners . . . which is paramount.

It is the purpose of the First

Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail .... ") (citations omitted).
146. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 631, 633 (1975) ("The
publishing business is . . . the only organized private business that is given explicit

constitutional protection .... [If] the Free Press guarantee meant no more than freedom of
expression, it would be a constitutional redundancy.").
147. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469,491 (1975) ("[I]n a society in which
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our democracy."" As James Madison wrote, "A popular Government,
without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a
Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy: or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be their own
Governors,
must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
9
4
gives." ,

Thus, the interests at stake on the media side of the equation necessarily
depend on the nature of the intercepted speech. If that speech is purely
private and has no relevance in public debate or to an informed citizenry,
then the interests at issue are relatively minimal. On the other hand, if the
intercepted speech addresses matters that are gravely important to public
discussion, the rights presented are of potentially enormous importance
and may lie at the very core of the First Amendment.' ° Nevertheless, I
still submit that adopting a public-concern test is not the appropriate way
to factor the public/private nature of the illegally intercepted speech into
resolution of the "ultimate question." Although it is undeniably an
important consideration, whether or not the speech at issue relates to a
matter of public concern should not be the sole deciding factor. Instead,
as described in Part III below, I believe that this consideration is
appropriately accounted for by analyzing how the nature of the speech at
each individual has but limited time and resources with which to observe at first hand the
operations of his government, he relies necessarily upon the press to bring to him in
convenient form the facts of those operations.").
148. As Justice Brandeis wrote:
Those who won our independence believed that the final end of the State was
to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its government the
deliberative forces should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness
and courage to be the secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as
you will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery and
spread of political, truth; that without free speech and assembly discussion
would be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate
protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine; that the greatest
menace to freedom is an inert people; that public discussion is a political duty;
and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
149. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in IX THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 103 (Gaillard Hunt, ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons 1910); accord 2 THOMAS
MCINTYRE COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 886 (1927) ("The evils to be prevented
were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of
which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely
essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.").
150. The public/private nature of the intercepted speech is the key consideration in the
second guiding principle that I propose. See discussion infra Part ll.B.
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issue influences the harm to the speaker and the benefit to the public
likely to result from publication.
B. The New York Times Principle
Before proposing a methodology for deciding whether the rights of the
individual speaker should trump those of the media and its audience, I
would like to suggest a second guiding principle - namely, that "our
profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" should drive First
Amendment analysis of the "ultimate question." I will refer to this second
principle as the "New York Times principle," because of its enunciation by
the Supreme Court in the seminal libel case of New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan. " '
Like the public-concern test favored in Bartnicki, the New York Times
principle is premised on the invaluable role that public discourse plays in
democratic self-government.'
Although courts have applied the First
Amendment to numerous categories of speech other than those that foster
"debate on public issues,""' it is clear that speech on matters of public
concern is of central importance to First Amendment jurisprudence." As
discussed above in Part II.A, it is also at the heart of the First Amendment
rights of the media and its audience. The press, with its access to
information and power to deliver vast quantities of information to large
numbers of people, plays an integral role in fulfilling the New York Times
principle. In a society characterized by omnipresent news available in
print, on the radio, on television, at any computer terminal, and through
wireless communication devices, the role of the press in facilitating public
debate can hardly be overstated.
Even so, I have previously discussed the potentially monumental
problems associated with defining what constitutes public speech. At first
glance, one might think that my condemnation of the public-concern test
adopted by the Bartnicki Court and subsequent endorsement of the New
151. 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). Harry Kalven wrote that Alexander Meiklejohn viewed
the New York Times decision as "an occasion for dancing in the streets." Harry Kalven, The
New York Times Case: A Note on 'The Central Meaning of the First Amendment", 1964

Sup. CT.REv. 191, 221 n.125.
152. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 269 ("'The maintenance of the opportunity for
free political discussion to the end that government may be responsive to the will of the
people and that changes may be obtained by lawful means, an opportunity essential to the
security of the Republic, is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system."') (quoting
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)).
153. See supra note 117.
154. See supra notes 115-16.
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York Times principle are inherently inconsistent. However, I would like
to propose that although definitional problems are fatal to the publicconcern test, these problems should not be used as an excuse to abandon
the goal of fostering an "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" national
debate. Definitional considerations certainly argue against extending First
Amendment protection only to speech on matters of public concern, but
they do not rise to such a level as to be an excuse for the Court to
abandon its long-held view that public speech is entitled to enhanced
constitutional protection. 5' Deserting such an important commitment on
definitional grounds alone would be an unfortunate case of the tail
wagging the dog.
The methodology proposed in Part III to address the "ultimate question"
largely avoids this problem because it is not premised on the idea that
public speech on the media side of the equation should necessarily trump
the private speech on the other side of the scale simply because a court
can categorize the former category as speech on a matter of public
concern. Accordingly, this methodology does not require a court to make
an absolute yes/no decision on whether the published information is
speech concerning a public affair, and thus it avoids the problematic first
step of precisely defining the public speech category. Admittedly, as
further explained in Part III, the test does require courts to evaluate the
relative public value of different types of speech so that courts can
compare the public benefit of publishing the information at issue to the
private harm that would likely result from publication. Even so, this
formulation has a distinct.advantage over the categorical public-concern
test in that a court does not automatically grant or deny First Amendment
protection to the speech at issue on the basis of a potentially artificial and
incorrect definition. The proposed methodology gives some weight,
although not conclusive, to the New York Times principle while avoiding
the talismanic approach that could be more harmful than helpful to the
development of meaningful public debate.
Il. A Methodology for Resolving the "Ultimate Question"
Having set forth the guiding principles, the final task in presenting an
alternative to the Bartnicki Court's public-concern test is to develop a
workable methodology that implements those principles. Toward that end,
I propose that the "ultimate question" is best answered by weighing the

155. After all, "[t]here is... a commonsense difference between purely personal gripes
and gossip, on the one hand, and proposals for political reform on the other." Estlund, supra
note 106, at 4.
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harm to the individual speaker against the benefit to the public that would
result from publication, 5 ' a calculus that I will refer to as the
"harm/benefit paradigm." In those instances in which the harm to the
individual speaker is greater than the benefit to the public, the speech and
privacy rights of the individual speaker should take precedence over the
First Amendment rights of the media and its audience, and in those
instances in which the benefit to the public outweighs the harm to the
individual speaker, courts should extend First Amendment protection to
the media and its audience at the expense of the rights of the individual
speaker.
Before elaborating on the harm/benefit paradigm, I first want to address
the argument that balancing is an inappropriate way to decide "ultimate
question" cases. Because Professor Volokh is undoubtedly right in his
observation that the individual speaker's rights are not of constitutional
proportion and because there clearly are constitutional rights at stake on
the media side of the scale, one might argue that the media should always
win and that the First Amendment should categorically protect the
publication of truthful information. However, the mere imbalance between
non-constitutional and constitutional rights does not necessarily mean that
courts should always give primacy to the constitutional rights of the
media. Courts could only base such an approach on the premise that the
First Amendment is an absolute that can never be trumped by nonconstitutional interests.' As Alexander Meiklejohn stated the position,

156. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 483 P.2d 34, 42 (Cal. 1971) (noting that "the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment do not require total abrogation of the right to
privacy. The goals sought by each may be achieved with a minimum of intrusion upon the
other").

157. The most famous proponent of an absolutist First Amendment theory was Justice
Hugo Black. He stated,
I do not subscribe to [the balancing approach] for I believe that the First
Amendment's unequivocal command that there shall be no abridgment of the
rights of free speech and assembly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of
Rights did all the "balancing" that was to be done....
I fear that the creation of "tests" by which speech is left unprotected under
certain circumstances is a standing invitation to abridge it.
Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 61, 63 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting);
accord HUGo L. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1968); Hugo L. Black, The Bill of
Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REv. 865 (1960); Edmond Cahn, Justice Black and First Amendment
"Absolutes": A Public Interview, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 549, 553, 559 (1962) (reporting that
Black viewed the command that Congress shall make "no law" abridging the freedom of
speech as literally meaning "no law," "without any ifs, buts, or whereases").
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"The phrase, 'Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,' is unqualified. It admits of no exceptions. To say that no laws of
a given type shall be made means that no laws of that type shall, under
any circumstances, be made."'58 For obvious reasons, absolutism has
serious drawbacks,'59 including society's interest in reigning in speech
that incites violence,"' speech that wrongfully injures the public standing
of others, 6 ' speech that expresses hatred toward ethnic, racial, or gender

Justices Frankfurter and Harlan rejected absolutism in favor of a balancing approach. As
Justice Harlan wrote for the majority in Konigsberg,
[W]e reject the view that freedom of speech and association.. . are "absolutes,"
not only in the undoubted sense that where the constitutional protection exists
it must prevail, but also in the sense that the scope of that protection must be
gathered solely from a literal reading of the First Amendment. Throughout its
history this Court has consistently recognized . . . [that] constitutionally
protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license to talk.
Konigsberg, 366 U.S. at 49-50 (footnote omitted).
For more on the debate between the absolutist and balancing schools, see John Hart Ely,
Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Laurent B. Franz, The First
Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE L.J. 1424 (1962); Harry Kalven, Jr., Upon Rereading
Mr. Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REV. 428 (1967).
158. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 106, at 17. Later, Meiklejohn softened his position and
acknowledged that
[n]o one can doubt that, in any well-governed society, the legislature has both
the right and the duty to prohibit certain forms of speech. Libelous assertions
may be, and must be, forbidden and punished. So too must slander. Words
which incite men to crime are themselves criminal and must be dealt with as
such. Sedition and treason may be expressed by speech or writing. And, in
those cases, decisive repressive action by the government is imperative for the
sake of the general welfare. All these necessities that speech be limited are
recognized and provided for under the Constitution.
Id. at 18.
159. See SMOLLA, supra note 135, at 2-6 ("Although absolutism is attractive for its
intense commitment to freedom of speech, it proves to be too brittle and simplistic a
methodology, and is simply not viable as a general working approach to speech problems.").
160. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (noting that the First
Amendment permits a state to forbid advocacy "where such'advocacy is directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action");
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) ("The question in every case is whether
the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.").
161. See, e.g., Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986)
("[W]hen the speech is of exclusively private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure...
the constitutional requirements do not necessarily force any change in at least some of the
features of the common-law landscape"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974)
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groups, 2 and speech that endangers national security.163 As Justice
Frankfurter put it, "The demands of free speech in a democratic society as
well as the interest in national security are better served by candid and
informed weighing of the competing interests, within the confines of the
judicial process, than by announcing dogmas too inflexible for the nonEuclidian problems to be solved."'"
Accordingly, there are compelling reasons to limit the press's publication
rights if not doing so would result in invasions of privacy and the chilling
of private speech to a degree that society finds unacceptable. The
harm/benefit paradigm is designed to find that point at which publication
has unacceptable consequences, and likewise, to identify those cases in
which extending First Amendment protection to the publication of
unlawfully acquired information is the optimal outcome.'6 In the next

two sections, I discuss the factors that influence the harm and the benefit
sides of the calculus, and I suggest how courts should measure the
competing interests when applying the harm/benefit paradigm.

(holding that states may define standards of liability for publishers of defamatory falsehoods
about a private person, so long as that standard does not impose liability without fault); New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (allowing libel actions by public figures
who can prove that the speaker made the libelous statements with "actual malice - that is,
with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not").
162. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 252 (1952) (sustaining defendant's
conviction for distributing a leaflet calling for public officials to "halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people, their property, neighborhoods and persons,
by the Negro").
163. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (upholding the convictions
of members of the Communist Party for advocating an overthrow of the United States
government by force and violence); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (holding
that defendant's conviction for distributing a leaflet urging violation of the draft laws does
not violate the First Amendment).
164. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
165. Balancing has a long and illustrious history in First Amendment jurisprudence. In
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399 (1950), Chief Justice Vinson
wrote that when deciding between claims of free speech and claims of public order, "the duty
of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater
protection under the particular circumstances presented." Similarly, Justice Harlan was of the
view that "[w]here First Amendment rights are asserted to bar governmental interrogation(,]
resolution of the issue always involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private
and public interests at stake in the particular circumstances shown." Barenblatt v. United
States, 360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
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A. Harm to the Individual Speaker
How should a court determine the amount of harm that an individual
speaker is likely to experience from the publication of a private conversation? Is this a purely subjective consideration that varies from person to
person and conversation to conversation, or are there determinative factors
that lend some predictability to the inquiry? If such factors do exist, are
they of a type that a court is well suited to evaluate?
Harm to the individual speaker primarily depends on two factors, each
of which is already part of First Amendment jurisprudence.'" The first
determinant is where the individual speaker falls on the public official/public figure/private speaker continuum. Someone who has no
involvement in public life and finds her private conversations the subject
of a CNN special is likely to feel more violated and more harmed by that
disclosure than is a public official or a public figure who has knowingly
chosen a career or lifestyle that may subject her to media scrutiny."
This is not to suggest that a public official who has the details of her
private life revealed does not experience personal harm. Take, for instance,
the Bill Clinton-Monica Lewinsky scandal. The President of the United
States is perhaps the paradigmatic public official, but this does not
eliminate the personal and professional suffering that he and his family
experienced as a result of the intense media scrutiny of his private life. 6 '

166. See infra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
167. In the libel context, the Supreme Court has recognized that private persons are
"more vulnerable to injury" than public figures. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S, 323,
344 (1974). "Private individuals are not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials
and public figures; they are also more deserving of recovery." Id. at 345.
168. See, e.g., Helen Dewar, Senators Envision Swift Clinton Trial; Need to Call
Witnesses Is Discounted, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1998, at Al (reporting that the Republican
senators planned to resist censure as an alternative to impeachment before the completion of
a full-blown Senate trial); David Willman, Questioning Resumes in Lewinsky Inquiry Probe:
Grandjury hearsfrom three Who had roles supervisingex-intern, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1998,
at A16 (quoting former White House Deputy Chief of Staff Harold M. Ickes on the
"Gestapo" tactics adopted by independent counsel Ken Starr). As an aside, the ClintonLewinsky scandal, like the paradigmatic "ultimate question," has its origins in the
surreptitious recording and subsequent disclosure of private conversations. The Lewinsky
saga first came to light "on Jan. 12[, 1998,] after a friend of Lewinsky's from the Pentagon,
Linda Tripp, provided secret recordings of numerous conversations in which Lewinsky
described having intimate relations with the president." Willman, supra.
Other examples demonstrating the harm that even public officials and public figures
experience as a result of invasions of their privacy span the spectrum of political figures,
celebrities, and athletes, including, for example, the publication of Senator Robert Packwood's
diaries. See, e.g., Cynthia Hanson & Abraham McLaughlin, Citing Senator Packwood's
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However, the point is that the relative injury that a public official or
public figure experiences as a result of the prying press is likely to be less
than that experienced by a private individual. By choosing to enter public
life, an individual reveals general information about her risk preferences
with respect to potential invasions of her privacy. Moreover, both public
officials and public figures are likely to have greater access to the mass
media to repair their damaged reputations than is a private figure.'"
Even so, the decision to enter public life is obviously not a perfect proxy
for an individual's tolerance for invasions of her privacy. For instance,
someone with a deep aversion to having the private details of her life
exposed might nevertheless enter public life if the expected benefits are
great enough. In such a case, the harm that she would experience from the
publication of an illegally intercepted conversation might be no less than
the harm that a purely private individual would experience in similar
circumstances. However, as a general matter, the decision to enter public
life does suggest a relatively high tolerance for public disclosure of private
matters." ' Consequently, the more public the person, the less harm that
she is likely to experience as a result of the publication of unlawfully
obtained information.
The second determining factor on the harm to the speaker side of the
equation is the public/private nature of the intercepted speech. As with the
public/private nature of the speaker, there is an inverse correlation between
the public nature of the speech at issue and the harm to the speaker, i.e.,

Diaries as Evidence, CHRISTIAN SCI.

MONITOR, Sept. 18, 1995, at 2 (reporting that the
Center for Responsive Politics filed complaints against Senator Packwood with the Federal
Election Commission based on evidence from Senator Packwood's diaries cited as evidence

of campaign wrongdoing); Associated Press, Justice Dept. Drops Packwood Inquiry, N.Y.

TIMES, July 24, 1996, at A20 (reporting that the Department of Justice ultimately decided not
to prosecute Packwood over accusations that he altered his diaries to obstruct an investigation
into sexual and official misconduct).
169. As Chief Justice Warren noted, "[A]s a class these 'public figures' have as ready
access as 'public officials' to mass media of communication, both to influence policy and to
counter criticism of their views and activities." Curtis Pubrg Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164
(1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
170. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345 ("[Tlhe communications media are entitled to act on
the assumption that public officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves
to increased risk of injury from defamatory falsehood concerning them. No such assumption
is justified with respect to a private individual. He has not accepted public office or assumed
an 'influential role in ordering society.' He has relinquished no part of his interest in the
protection of his own good name, and consequently he has a more compelling call on the
courts for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Thus, private individuals are
not only more vulnerable to injury than public officials and public figures; they are also more
deserving of recovery.") (citation omitted).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss4/3

2002]

TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN SPEECH

as a general matter, as the public nature of the intercepted speech
increases, the harm to the speaker of having otherwise private communications published likely decreases. Conversely, as the speech moves
down the public/private continuum toward the private endpoint, the harm
to the speaker likely increases. For example, all else being equal, a purely
private person would probably prefer to have her views on an upcoming
school board election published in her local newspaper than the intensely
personal details of a spat with her husband. And the same generally holds
true for public officials and public figures. Those who have chosen to
enter public life do so with full knowledge that their views on public
issues are likely to become widely known. Indeed, this is often the point
of choosing to become a public official or a public figure. However, even
public figures generally expect to maintain some degree of privacy with
respect to their personal lives. Accordingly, a public official or public
figure, just like a private figure, will likely experience greater harm when
the published information concerns private, as opposed to public, matters.
As mentioned above, courts are well equipped to evaluate both of the
primary determinants of the harm to the speaker, because both are already
part of First Amendment jurisprudence. For example, courts have long
broken down libel law along public official, public figure, and private
figure lines,'" and extensive case law concerning the characteristics of
each category has developed." Additionally, with respect to the second
determinant, the Supreme Court has often indicated in dictum that it
distinguishes between speech on matters of public concern and speech on
matters of private concern, 73 and that speech on matters of public
concern is entitled to the highest level of First Amendment protection.'74
171. Courts categorize libel plaintiffs as public officials, public figures, or private
figures. See id. at 347 (holding that the "States may define for themselves the appropriate
standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehoods injurious to a
private individual") (emphasis added); Curtis Publ'g Co., 388 U.S. at 134 (applying New

York Times to libel actions "instituted by persons who are not public officials, but who are
'public figures' and involved in issues in which the public has a justified and important
interest") (emphasis added); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)
("The constitutional guarantees require... a federal rule that prohibits a public official from
recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice."') (emphasis added).
172. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979); Wolston v. Reader's Digest
Ass'n, Inc., 443 U.S. 157 (1979); Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
173. Cf

ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY,

COMMUNITY,

MANAGEMENT 280 (1995) ("Traditional First Amendment doctrine presupposes some form

of a public/private distinction.").

174. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 533-34 (2001) (noting that "[tihe
enforcement of [the Wiretapping Statute] in this case ...implicates the core purposes of the
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As discussed in Part I.C, the Court has generally declined to categorically
exclude speech on matters of private concern from constitutional
protection, but through its statements about the important role that
"newsworthy" or "public speech" plays in a democratic society, the Court
has demonstrated a willingness to differentiate between public and private
speech. Accordingly, an analysis of the relative public nature of illegally
intercepted information is not a task that is foreign to the judiciary.
Moreover, it is not an exercise that necessarily requires courts to define
with precision the contours of what constitutes speech on matters of public
concern. Instead, a court must make only a relative determination of
where the speech likely falls on the public/private continuum.
The harm to the individual speaker resulting from the publication of
unlawfully intercepted information can be depicted graphically as set forth
in Graph 1 below. In Graph 1,the y-axis represents the public/private
nature of the speech, and the x-axis represents the public/private nature of
the speaker. As shown by the solid line extending through points I and 2,
the harm to the individual speaker decreases as (1)the public nature of the
speech at issue increases and (2) the public nature of the speaker increases.
For instance, in the case of a relatively private speaker and relatively
private speech (point A), the corresponding point on the harm to the
individual speaker line is very high (point 1), thus indicating a relatively
high level of harm that could be expected from publication. Conversely, in
the case of a relatively public speaker and relatively public speech (point
B),"6 the corresponding point on the harm to the individual speaker line
is relatively low (point 2). Again, I am not arguing that a public figure
engaged in a private conversation on a matter of public significance has no
privacy interests at stake. Indeed, the very fact that the public figure is
discussing such matters in private rather than at a press conference, for
example, suggests a strong desire to keep the content of that conversation
out of public view. Nevertheless, a public official discussing a newsworthy

First Amendment because it imposes sanctions on the publication of truthful information of
public concern") (emphasis added); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980) (expressing
the view that speech on matters of public concern is entitled to the "highest rung" of
constitutional protection); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) ("If a
newspaper lawfully obtains truthful information about a matter of public significance then
state officials may not constitutionally punish publication of the information, absent a need
to further a state interest of the highest order.") (emphasis added).
175. To add context to an otherwise abstract discussion, think of point A as representing, for example, the librarian in your local public library having a conversation with his
wife about their daughter's progress in school.
176. To contextualize point B, think of Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United
Nations, expressing his views on human rights abuses in China.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss4/3

2002]

TRAFFICKING IN STOLEN SPEECH

605

GRAPH I
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topic has much less personal privacy at stake than does the speaker
represented by point A.
To determine how courts should resolve the "ultimate question"
involving the speech and speakers represented by points A and B, it is
necessary to derive the benefit to the public that is likely to result from
publication in those situations and then to compare that benefit to the
corresponding harm. In the next section, I derive a benefit-to-the-public
line that can be overlaid on Graph I to solve the "ultimate question."
B. Benefit to the Public
The public/private nature of the speaker and the public/private nature of
the speech are also the primary determinants of the magnitude of the
aggregate benefit that the public is likely to receive from the publication
of unlawfully acquired information. With respect to the first determinant - the public/private nature of the speaker - the benefit to the
public that is likely to result from publication generally increases as the
speaker moves up the public/private continuum toward the public endpoint.
For instance, courts can expect that the President of the United States'
private statements on a nuclear arms agreement with Russia will have a
greater influence on public debate than a purely private citizen's opinions

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:559

on the same issue.'" Similarly, even in the case of speech that concerns
a purely private matter, the speech of a public official or a public figure
is more relevant to fulfillment of the New York Times principle than the
speech of a private individual.""
With respect to the second determinant - the public/private nature of
the speech - as a general matter, the benefit to the public increases as the
public nature of the speech increases. As discussed earlier, when the
"ultimate question" involves the publication of speech that relates to a
matter of public concern, the First Amendment rights of the media and its
audience are of greater significance than when the published information
relates to a purely private matter. Similarly, the New York Times principle
is also premised on the importance of speech on matters of public concern.
Indeed it is virtually a truism that public speech is more integral to an
"uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" public debate than is speech that is
not on a matter of public concern.
Accordingly, the benefit to the public and its relationship to the
public/private nature of the speaker and the public/private nature of the
speech can be depicted graphically as set forth in Graph 2 below.

177. This is also likely to be the case with a public figure, as opposed to a public
official. As Chief Justice Warren noted, "Our citizenry has a legitimate and substantial
interest in the conduct of [public officials and public figures], and freedom of the press to
engage in uninhibited debate about their involvement in public issues and events is as crucial
as it is in the case of 'public officials."' Curtis Publ'g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967)
(Warren, C.J., concurring).
178. Although a public official's statements on purely private matters have less impact
on achieving a robust public debate than do his statements on more public topics, statements
on private matters nevertheless have a greater impact on public debate than similar statements
made by a private citizen. For instance, Bill Clinton was constantly subjected to the
argument that the decisions made in his private life were relevant to his fitness to serve as
President. See, e.g., Aubrey Immelman, Personality Scrutiny Brings Fewer Presidential
Surprises, ST. CLOUD TIMES, Mar. 11, 2001, at 7B ("[Plersonality problems do not
materialize from emerging circumstances to afflict presidents. It is a preexisting condition,
perhaps undetected, that accompanies a president into office .... My psychological profile
characterized Bill Clinton as being predisposed to 'self-centeredness, arrogance, and a sense
of entitlement,' and prone to leaving 'a trail of broken promises and outrageous acts' and ultimately - 'a fall from grace."'). But see Shaw, supra note 134 ("Sexual infidelity is
immoral but it is not illegal, and it has about as much to do with the democratic process as
Hillary's hairdo .... Regardless of what one thinks of Bill Clinton as a president or as a
husband, it would be bad for this country .. . if the media helped bring down a president
simply because he couldn't keep his fly zipped.").
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As shown by the solid benefit-to-the-public line extending through
points A and B, the benefit increases as (1) the public nature of the speech
increases and (2) the public nature of the speaker increases. At point
A, which represents a relatively private speaker engaged in relatively
private speech, the aggregate public benefit of publication is relatively
low. For instance, it is clear that your neighbor's private conversations
about her personal struggles with drug addiction have relatively little chance
of warranting front-page news coverage."' Even with respect to national
drug policy, which is undoubtedly a matter of public concern, her individual
experiences are unlikely to have broad public significance. Conversely, at
point B, which represents a highly public speaker engaged in speech that is
highly relevant to public debate, the benefit to the public from publication is
relatively high.

179. For comparability and continuity, point A and point B on Graph 2 represent the
same respective speakers and speech discussed earlier in the context of Graph 1.
180. This assumes, of course, that your neighbor is not a public official or a public
figure and that her addiction has not resulted in independently newsworthy events, such as
the commission of violent crimes.
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C. Implementing the Harm/Benefit Paradigm
Having derived graphical representations of the harm to the speaker and the
benefit to the public, the final step in implementing a methodology to resolve
the "ultimate question" is to combine Graphs 1 and 2 into a single graph
from which courts may derive a solution.
GRAPH 3
Public

Speech

Y

Private
Speaker

Graph 3 presents the full range of public/private speech and public/private
speakers, and thus constitutes a theoretical solution to the range of possible
scenarios in which the "ultimate question" could arise. For every potential
combination in which the benefit to the public exceeds the harm to the
individual speaker, i.e., every point that is to the right of the asterisk on the
x-axis, a court should uphold the First Amendment publication rights of the
media, regardless of whether the publisher acted unlawfully in obtaining the
information. On the other hand, a court should give primacy to the privacy
and speech rights of the individual speaker at every point on the graph where
the harm to the individual speaker that has resulted from publication exceeds
the benefit to the public, i.e., every point that is to the left of the asterisk on
the x-axis. For speech with a public/private level indicated by the asterisk on
the y-axis and a speaker with a public/private level indicated by the asterisk
on the x-axis, the harm to the individual speaker that would result from
publication exactly equals the benefit to the public. In this situation, a court
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should be indifferent between honoring the rights of the speaker or the rights
of the press.
Having previously discussed the expected harm and benefit associated with
points A and B, which have been carried forward to Graph 3 from Graphs
1 and 2, it is now possible to synthesize that information to reach the optimal
judicial decision for both cases. First, at point A above, which corresponds
to private speech (i.e., point Y on the y-axis) and a private speaker (i.e., point
W on the x-axis), the expected harm to the speaker from publication exceeds
the benefit to the public by the amount of the vertical distance between points
I and A. In this case, a court maximizes social welfare by concluding that
the speech and privacy rights of the individual speaker trump the First
Amendment rights of the media and its audience.
At point B above, which corresponds to speech that is highly relevant to
public discourse (i.e., point Z on the public/private speech continuum) and
a speaker that is a public figure or a public official (i.e., point X on the
public/private speaker continuum), publication would result in benefit to the
public in excess of the harm to the individual speaker by the amount of the
vertical distance between points B and 2. Accordingly, a court should
conclude in this instance that the First Amendment protects the publication
of unlawfully intercepted information.
Obviously, the real judicial work comes in finding where a particular case
falls on Graph 3. In proposing the harm/benefit paradigm as a solution to the
"ultimate question," I have not intended to suggest that the "ultimate
question" is susceptible to simplistic cost/benefit analysis that is more
appropriately carried out by machine than by judicial mind. The real work
in resolving a case presenting the "ultimate question" involves the following
steps: (1) evaluating the nature of the intercepted speech; (2) evaluating the
characteristics of the participants in the conversation at issue; (3) determining
whether the general rules regarding the benefit to the public and the harm to
the speaker do in fact hold true in the instant case; and (4) comparing the
relative harm and benefit by means of the type of analysis that is facilitated
by Graph 3. These steps find their origins in existing First Amendment
jurisprudence and continue to require the deliberative skills for which courts
are particularly well suited. Rather than seeking to reduce resolution of the
"ultimate question" to an arithmetic exercise, the harm/benefit paradigm is
primarily a tool that rationalizes the interrelationships between the determining factors and offers a coherent framework for analyzing the "ultimate
question."
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IV. Implications of the Harm/Benefit Paradigm
As a general matter, the harm/benefit paradigm favors extending First
Amendment protection to the media in those instances in which the
intercepted communication involves a public speaker speaking on matters of
public significance. Correlatively, it tends to protect the individual speaker's
rights in those instances in which the intercepted communication involves a
private speaker speaking on purely private matters that have little public
significance. These general trends further the policies advanced by both the
competing rights principle and the New York Times principle. By considering
the competing rights on both sides of the calculus, the harm/benefit paradigm
avoids unacceptably chilling private discussion, while also enhancing debate
on matters of public significance. The outcomes reached under this
methodology maximize the quantity of both public and private speech by
ensuring that the Constitution protects the publication of speech that is
relevant to public debate, while assuring that adequate privacy protections
will remain in place for the speech that is less relevant to public dis82
course.
Perhaps most importantly, the harm/benefit paradigm provides the
flexibility that categorical approaches, including the public-concern test
adopted by the Bartnicki Court, fail to offer. As suggested by Graph 3, there
are some types of speech that if illegally intercepted from a public official or
a public figure and subsequently published should be entitled to constitutional
protection, but, if intercepted from a private figure and subsequently
published, should not be protected. For instance, at point 1 on Graph 3,
which corresponds to speech that is highly relevant to public discourse (i.e.,
point Z on the public/private speech continuum) and a speaker that is a
relatively private individual (i.e., point W on the public/private speaker
continuum), publication would result in harm to the individual speaker in
excess of the benefit to the public by the amount of the vertical distance
between points 1 and A. In this case, the harm/benefit paradigm suggests that
the First Amendment should not protect publication. However, if speech
having the same public relevance (i.e., a public/private speech level of Z) was
intercepted from a highly public speaker (e.g., a public/private speaker level
181. This is not to say that the First Amendment should never protect the publication
of illegally intercepted private speech, but only that the universe of private information the
publication of which should be constitutionally protected is relatively small. Private figures
should be relatively comfortable that their conversations about private matters could not
lawfully be published, although there is a subset of private speech that, if illegally intercepted
from highly public figures and subsequently published, might warrant constitutional
protection under the harm/benefit paradigm.
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of X), the benefit to the public would exceed the harm to the individual
speaker by the amount of the vertical distance between points B and 2, and
honoring the media's First Amendment rights over the rights of the individual
speaker would be the desirable outcome. If the unlawful publication of this
same speech were to come before a court that favored the public-concern test,
such a court would likely extend constitutional protection to the media
defendants in both of the cases described above (regardless of the nature of
the speaker). Although the result reached under the public-concern test would
be the "correct" result in one of the cases, the public-concern test would yield
the suboptimal result in the other. Thus, the public-concern test presents the
danger of protecting the publication of marginally relevant public speech at
the expense of significantly chilling private speech. Conversely, the
harm/benefit paradigm, by considering both the competing rights principle
and the New York Times principle, avoids unacceptably chilling private
discussion, while also enhancing public debate on matters of public
significance.
Conclusion
It is now almost clich6 to say that the information age is upon us, but it is
true that we live in a world where news and information are more readily
available than ever before. Along with the proliferation of twenty-four-hour
news, the World Wide Web, cellular telephones, and wireless communication
devices, both the press and everyone else have unprecedented access to
information in ways that we could not conceive of just a few years ago. As
a general matter, this is a good thing. One need not carve out time to watch
the nightly news at the risk of being out of touch with the world. One need
not leave the comfort of her living room to access information that was once
only available in the reference rooms of our best libraries. However, there
have been, and will continue to be, unfortunate consequences that come about
as a result of the information age, and the invasion of privacy is near, if not
at, the top of the list. In some instances, it will be possible to classify such
invasions as categorically wrong, for instance, when they facilitate credit card
or identity theft. However, there will undoubtedly be more morally
ambiguous violations as well. Think, for example, of the reporter who
illegally intercepts e-mail messages between a senator and the CEO of
Corporation X, who keeps the senator on his payroll in exchange for political
favors. What will we do when a media outlet publishes the story of bribery
and corruption and the reporter is languishing in prison or struggling to pay
hefty fines for having published information that he acquired illegally?
There are compelling reasons that society should favor the limited
extension of constitutional protection to the publication of unlawfully
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obtained speech. However, courts cannot extend this protection lightly,
categorically, or without serious deliberation that takes into account the
privacy rights on both sides of the equation. But neither can courts deny this
protection on the grounds of privacy rights alone. I have tried to give
structure and reason to the inquiry required by this "ultimate question" of
First Amendment law, and in the process, I have attempted to demonstrate
that the current path of Supreme Court jurisprudence toward a pure publicconcern test is doctrinally dangerous and ultimately unworkable. As an
alternative, I have proposed the harm/benefit paradigm, which synthesizes
existing First Amendment doctrine into a coherent framework that rationalizes
resolution of the "ultimate question." In the end, the harm/benefit paradigm
honors the freedom of the press and protects public speech, but not at the
extraordinary cost of private citizens' legitimate expectations of privacy and
an unacceptable chilling of private speech.
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